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Abstract
Does managed care send expectant mothers to hospitals they would choose even if
their choice of hospital was not limited? I find that Medicaid managed care patients are
redirected to hospitals that enrollees of more generous insurance payers with the same
personal characteristics do not go to. However, Medicare managed care enrollees do not
face an increased risk of having a cesarean delivery at the hospital they attend, which is
interpreted as evidence that they are redirected to high quality hospitals.
Managed care has been successful in reducing the price and length of stay of hospital
visits in part by selectively contracting with hospitals to create a network of hospitals to
provide all health services to enrollees. A more recent innovation has been the creation
of networks to provide only a narrow range of services, a strategy widely used by
managed behavioral health organization (MBHO) firms in the provision of mental health
and substance abuse services. I find that if hospitals are able to set price above cost, then
less competition increases the difference between price and cost. However, if a hospital
bargains with the MBHO over price, then the level of competition in the hospital's
market does not affect price. If the MBHO sets price and the hospital has some ability to
increase the length of stay, the level of competition does not affect length of stay with the
exception of in the Boston market.
Although insurance payers vary in their reimbursement methods, hospitals may set
average length of stay in common across all payers in response to economies of scale or
scope. The commonality hypothesis states that as the share of patient days paid by an
insurance payer increases, the hospital will set length of stay more in line with the
incentives offered by that particular payer. I find some evidence to support the
commonality hypothesis: the more important Medicare and private managed care are to a
general hospital, the shorter the average length of stay of all patients.
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CHAPTERl
HOSPITAL NETWORKS IN MEDICAID MANAGED CARE &
THE CHOICE OF HOSPITAL FOR DELIVERY
1.1 Introduction
This paper asks whether Medicaid managed care has redirected patients to hospitals
they would not have chosen if their choice set was not limited. If so, have patients been
redirected to lower quality hospitals? Managed care is able to selectively contract with
hospitals through the creation of provider hospital networks. It has been widely proposed
in the literature that this may be a means of contracting with hospitals that offer lower
quality care at lower cost. Alternatively, managed care may be a means of producing
care of equivalent or better quality at lower cost. Managed care plans argue that they are
more informed than individual consumers and therefore are in a better position to obtain
high quality care at lower cost.
Medicaid is a federal-state program, which provides health insurance to low income
populations. The cost of the Medicaid program has increased substantially over time.
The increase can be attributed to expansions in eligibility and increases in medical prices
over the years. For example, in 1990 the federal government mandated that states must
cover pregnant women in families with incomes equal to or less than 133 percent of the
federal poverty rate. Although Medicaid expenditures have increased, the rate of growth
has fallen substantially since 1992. This reduction in payments per enrollee is widely
attributed to an increase in the number of Medicaid managed care enrollees. Medicaid
managed care enrollments increased from less than 10% in 1991 to almost 56% in 1999.
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The increase in enrollments is partly due to the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which
abolished the need for states to receive federal waivers to require Medicaid recipients to
enroll in managed care plans. Today, managed care plans provide health care to the
majority of Americans, both in the public and private sector.
I evaluate the effect of Medicaid managed care on the quality of the hospitals chosen,
both from the perspective of patients and managed care plans. I investigate the choice of
hospital for Medicaid managed care enrollees and compare it with the choice made by
Medicaid fee-for-service and private HMO enrollees. In addition, I ask whether managed
care has channeled patients towards lower quality hospitals. Or is it the case that
managed care plans, having more industry knowledge than patients direct them to high
quality hospitals at lower cost than in the fee-for-service sector?
The research examines hospital choice and quality in the context of the decision
where to give birth. Maternal delivery is chosen as it has a relatively large number of
observations, which allows for precise estimates of the key parameters. In addition, there
is a large time gap between finding out that one is going to give birth and the birth
occurring, thereby allowing patients' time to choose which hospital they would prefer to
attend. The empirical research is based on Medicaid and private HMO discharges from
acute care hospitals in Massachusetts in 1999.
I find that there is clear redirection of Medicaid managed care patients. However,
they are no more likely to have a cesarean delivery than a private HMO enrollee, which is
interpreted as evidence of redirection to a high quality hospital. Section 1.2 explains why
managed care creates hospital networks. Section 1.3 reviews the relevant literature.
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Section 1.4 outlines the estimation strategy for identifying redirection and hospital
quality. Section 1.5 provides data sources and descriptive results. Section 1.6 gives the
estimation results and section 1.7 concludes with a discussion of the findings.
1.2 Managed Care and Hospital Networks
Health insurance pays the charges or costs of health care, generally with the consumer
paying a deductible or coinsurance, and does not impose on the consumer the full
marginal cost of the last unit of care he consumes as efficiency requires. This leads to the
problem of moral hazard with the possible over-consumption of health care services.
Managed care has come about as a way of dealing with the moral hazard issue by
imposing a small financial risk on consumers. In order to be able to do this, managed
care must alter the behavior of providers, in this case hospitals.
Preadmission certification, concurrent utilization review and mandatory second-
opinion surgery programs are widely used methods for restricting potentially unnecessary
care. Another method is the creation of networks, specifically hospital networks.
Managed care plans' ability to selectively contract with health care providers is an
important mechanism that plans use to minimize health costs. They can choose providers
on the basis of cost and quality, or they might use their leverage as large purchasers of
health care to alter the provider's behavior. Through selective contracting, a managed
care plan can credibly threaten to exclude providers from its network, and thereby
negotiate lower provider prices (Town and Vistnes, 1997). In return for offering services
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at a discount, providers gain access to a broader consumer market. They may be
guaranteed a certain volume of patients as well as prompt payments for services.
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) are a form of managed care in which the
functions of insurance and provision of care are combined. HMOs receive an annual
fixed payment per enrollee. Higher profit is directly proportional to the number of
healthy enrollees as they use fewer services. Therefore it is in the best interest of HMOs
to keep enrollees healthy by providing high quality care. The organizational form of
HMOs eliminates the apparent over-consumption incentives and replaces them with cost-
control incentives, and even possibly incentives toward under-consumption. Financial
incentives for HMO enrollees to use contracting providers are very strong, since use of
non-contracting providers is usually not covered except in emergencies. In contrast to
managed care, fee-for-service plans allow enrollees to decide which provider they wishto
attend. In this case, providers earn more, the more services used by enrollees.
Managed care plans argue that they are more capable shoppers than patients, for they
shop on behalf of potentially thousands of patients and can therefore afford to purchase
information systems that permit comparison of complex cost and quality information
(Escarce et aI, 1999). Primary care physicians often limit their referrals to a narrow
network of close associates and their hospital. HMOs have, at least in theory, the
potential to create networks based on value, rather than professional relationships.
Hospitals compete on the basis of price and quality attributes for inclusion into
provider networks. Feldman et al (1990) find hospital location and range of services that
the hospital provides are the major HMO consideration in the selection of hospitals with
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whom to affiliate. There was no indication as to whether HMOs tend to affiliate with
lower-priced hospitals. Once a hospital is accepted in the network, the number of
patients it will admit per year will depend on patient perceptions of its fixed quality level
relative to the quality at other accepted hospitals. It is generally the case that the out-of-
pocket costs to consumers are the same regardless of which hospital they choose in the
network.
In exchange for delegating shopping responsibility to managed care, patients give up
free choice of provider. In the private HMO market, consumers choose from the plans
offered by their employer, e.g., Harvard Community Health Plan, Tufts Associated
Health Plan, or Neighborhood Health Plan. After choosing a plan, enrollees then choose
a primary care physician from the plan's network to provide or authorize all their care.
For specialty care, the primary care physician selects and refers the enrollee to a
specialist who practices with his or her physician group. If the care needed is not
available there, the primary care physician will select and refer the enrollee to a specialist
at another physician group within the network. Medicaid Managed Care enrollees must
enroll in or be assigned to a HMO before receiving coverage for medical benefits. The
HMOs l that have contracted with Medicaid in Massachusetts receive a capitated payment
for medical services based on the coverage type and rating category of each enrollee.
Enrollees in the Medicaid fee-for-service program are allowed to use any provider of
their choice if the provider is willing to take Medicaid patients.
1 In order of the number of discharges, the HMOs contracted with Medicaid are Neighborhood Health Plan,
Pilgrim Health Care, Tufts Associated Health Plan and Harvard Community Health Plan.
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1.3 Managed Care in the Literature
In a survey of the literature in the Handbook of Health Economics (2000) Glied finds
that during the eighties cost grew at equivalent rates or very slightly slower rates in
managed care plans than in non-managed care plans. More recent studies have found that
managed care rates of cost growth are slightly slower, as much as one percentage point
slower than traditional insurance premium growth. Fee-for-service care tends to
outperform managed care in terms of quality when using subjective measures, such as
consumer satisfaction with care. Yet there are few differences in the quality of care in
terms of outcomes provided in managed care plans versus conventional insurance plans.
The only significant differences in the quality of care were found for people with serious
health conditions, particularly those with low incomes.
Miller and Luft (1997) review thirty-seven peer-reviewed articles on managed care
plan performance published between 1993 and 1997. Evidence on quality of care from
fifteen of those studies showed an equal number of significantly better and worse HMO
results, compared with non-HMO plans. However, in several instances, Medicare HMO
enrollees with chronic conditions showed worse quality of care. The evidence does not
support suggestions that HMOs uniformly lead to worse quality of care. However, they
also do not show that HMOs have succeeded in improving overall quality of care as was
hoped. They attributed this in part to slow clinical practice change, lack of risk-adjusted
capitation rates, and inadequate quality measurement and reporting.
There has been relatively little work done on the area of Medicaid and managed care.
Currie and Fahr (2000) examine the impact of Medicaid managed care on utilization and
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health outcomes. They find that increased Medicaid managed care penetration has
significant effects on the composition of the Medicaid caseload with the access to
ambulatory care and hospitalization rates of blacks declining. They note that in addition
to a strong emphasis on cost containment within plans, managed care plans put
competitive pressures on other providers to reduce costs. These pressures may in tum
lead to a reduction in the provision of indigent care by hospitals and other providers.
Thus, the growth of Medicaid managed care plans, and of managed care more generally,
could reduce the quantity and quality of care rendered to the low-income population by
providers.
Levinson and Ullman (1998) study the effect of Medicaid managed care on prenatal
care adequacy and infant birth weights. After controlling for demographic and health
characteristic of mothers, they find that there are no statistical differences between
managed care birth weights and fee-for-service birth weights. In addition, they find that
enrollment in managed care by Medicaid mothers is associated with increased use of
prenatal care. From this, they conclude that Medicaid managed care is able to provide
equal outcomes at lower costs by improving the incentives of both patients and providers
to engage in preventive care.
Glied et al (1997) compared Medicaid managed care plans with traditional Medicaid
in New York City. They examine the effects of selection on the evaluation of Medicaid
managed care where people voluntarily enroll in the program. They found that after
adjusting for population differences between the two groups, it eliminated the utilization
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savings from managed care. However, managed care did have a positive effect on access
to care.
Holohan et al (1998) examines expansions in the Medicaid managed care system in
thirteen states. They find that contracting with mainstream HMOs rather than
predominantly Medicaid plans is becoming more common. However, they found that
mainstream plans tend to be more costly and appear to limit managed care's cost-saving
potential. In Massachusetts it was found that Medicaid's use of private HMOs are more
expensive than the state's own primary case management program.
There has been some recent work on the analysis of hospital network creation and its
effects. Town and Vistnes (1997) ask how the composition of a managed care plan's
network affects hospitals' pricing incentives and how the preferences of plans' enrollees
for particular hospitals affect the plan's network formation strategy and thus hospital
prices. They find that a hospital's bargaining power depends on the hospital's
incremental value to a health plan's networks, and that incremental value is determined
either by the plan's opportunity cost of replacing the hospital with another hospital
outside its network, or by dropping the hospital and relying on a smaller hospital
network. They propose that hospital competition should be viewed as competition for a
spot in a health plan's network, and the extent to which one hospital competes with
another depends on which hospitals are already in the plan's network and how each
hospital complements other hospitals in the plan's network.
Ma and McGuire (2000) suggest that managed care plans may redirect patients
towards providers that are most successful at curbing outpatient visits per episode of
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illness. They develop a theory of network incentives in managed care and define a
network as a subset of independent providers in a market who contract with an insurance
plan. The contract specifies payment and other terms on which the providers may be
reimbursed for covered services.
They argue that participation in a network confers an economic benefit on providers.
In return for participation in the network, the plan expects providers to adhere to its
protocols, in particular, the number of outpatient visits in an episode of care. A provider
that routinely exceeds the target number of visits may be penalized by the plan's attempt
to direct patients to other providers within its network. Their empirical results show that
network incentives account for most of the quantity reduction due to managed care.
The literature does not show overwhelming evidence that managed care has attained
its goal of maintaining if not improving the quality of care while reducing costs. The
data to be used in this research is more recent than the previously mentioned literature
and may show different trends as managed care becomes more prevalent. This paper
adds to the literature on Medicaid managed care and the control of moral hazard by
investigating whether the redirection of patients through the creation of hospital networks
has been successful in reducing the cost of care. There is no empirical literature on
networks redirecting Medicaid recipients. This is the main contribution of the paper.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy of the paper consists of two parts. The first part investigates
whether Medicaid managed care enrollees go to hospitals that they otherwise would not
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go to. The second part examines whether Medicaid managed care patients are sent to low
or high quality hospitals. Medicaid fee-for-service and private HMO patients are used as
a basis for comparing the performance of Medicaid managed care. Both groups are less
restricted in their choice of hospital than Medicaid managed care patients, which is
always better for consumers. I assume that the choice of health plan has already been
made and the consumer is unable to switch prior to the choice of hospital for delivery.
When a person is deciding which hospital to attend, I assume that not all possible
hospitals in the state are considered. Proximity of a hospital to a patient's residence and
facilities available are some of the factors that determine which hospital a patient
chooses. Patients are also constrained in their choice of hospital if enrolled in a managed
care plan. Therefore, it is necessary to group hospitals into relevant choice sets to
examine a patient's choice of hospitals. The most common method of grouping hospitals
is to identify a hospital's market based on a person's distance from the hospital. For
example, a person is regarded as being in a hospital's market if they are located within
the 95th percentile of the distribution of distance of patients from that hospital. Each
patient may be in the market of one or more hospitals. Measures such as the Herfindahl
index are then used to group hospitals together into markets. In this study the focus is not
on a hospital's market area or hospitals competing for patients as Medicaid patients are
not a highly sought after group by hospitals. Rather the attention is on which hospital
Medicaid managed care patients choose given that their choice set is limited.
Therefore, instead of using hospitals as a starting point, I begin with Medicaid
managed care patients and identify the de facto network of hospitals they choose for
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delivery. I use county of residence as the unit of analysis to group enrollees. Over fifty
percent of Medicaid managed care discharges live in three of the fourteen counties in
Massachusetts: Suffolk (22%), Plymouth (13%) and Essex (19%) counties. I focus
exclusively on Suffolk County, which encompasses Boston, as the largest group of
Medicaid managed care enrollees live in this county. Appendix 1.1 shows the discharge
patterns of Medicaid managed care and the comparison groups, Medicaid fee for service
and private HMOs. It is clear from Appendix 1.1 that discharges in all payer types are
concentrated amongst a few hospitals. Approximately 99% of all HMO discharges are
concentrated in 10 out of the 24 hospitals used by HMO enrollees living in Suffolk
County. 98% of all Medicaid managed care discharges were from one of the following
hospitals: Melrose-Wakefield, Beth Israel Deaconess, New England Medical Centre and
Boston Medical Center. Similarly for Medicaid fee-for-service discharges, 98% of
discharges are concentrated in 8 of the 19 hospitals that MCD-FFS enrollees used.
Hospitals accounting for the remaining 1% of HMO discharges and 2% of Medicaid
discharges were eliminated from the empirical work. Hospitals included in the empirical
estimation are denoted by an asterisk in Appendix 1.1.
1.4.1 Redirection
McFadden's conditionallogit model is used to estimate the probability of an
individual attending a hospital based on the individual's characteristics and the
characteristics of the hospitals in their choice set. The individual chooses a hospital for a
discrete episode to maximize utility relative to all other possible hospital choices.
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Consider an individual i, who chooses hospital} to maximize utility. The expected
utility from choosing hospital} is defined as:
(1.1)
where Hj are the characteristics of hospital}, e.g., bed size and teaching status. Tij is the
distance of individual i's residence to hospital} and Xi is a vector of personal
characteristics, e.g., age and race. Gij represents individual i's preferences for hospital}.
Assuming that the utility function is additively separable, it can be written as
follows:
(1.2)
where tastes are captured in the error term, Gij.
The individual is assumed to choose the hospital that maximizes expected utility and
that Gij is independently and identically distributed with Weibull distribution, McFadden
(1973) shows that the probability of individual i choosing hospital j, is equal to:
e(\';j+W;j)
Pr(Y;j =1) =-J---L e(\';/ +w;/)
1=1
(1.3)
An assumption of the conditionallogit model is that the choices are independent of
each other. This is referred to as the independence of irrelevant alternatives and is
derived from the assumption that the error terms are independent and identically
distributed. The implication is that the ratio of any two hospitals' choice probabilities is
unaffected by the availability of other alternative hospitals. Applying the assumption of
irrelevant alternatives, dropping hospitals that have few discharges should not affect the
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probability of choosing amongst the remaining hospitals. The validity of the
independence of irrelevant alternatives may be evaluated using the Hausman-McFadden
test (1984). This is a very strong assumption as other alternatives may become more
important when faced with a limited choice set.
After estimating the parameters of the choice model, I calculate the probability of a
representative individual going to a particular hospital depending on their insurance type.
If people, identical in all characteristics, except insurance type, have different
probabilities of going to the same hospital, this is interpreted as evidence of redirection.
In an ideal experiment world, the researcher randomly assigns people to the fee-for-
service sample and the managed care sample. As this is not possible in this case, the
identifying assumption of the model is that selection to Medicaid managed care is
uncorrelated with the unobservables in the hospital choice equation. That is, the error
term in the selection process is uncorrelated with the error term in the structural process.
1.4.2 Quality Indicator
The rate of cesarean section in a hospital is used as a maternal quality indicator by the
Agency for Health Care Research and Quality, a public health service agency in the
Department of Health and Human Services. Keeler et al. (1997) state that cesarean
delivery measures are one of the first measures used to judge hospital performance.
According to the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality maternal complications
such as hemorrhage, infection, and mortality are more common in women who have a
cesarean section than among women who deliver vaginally. Cesarean section is the most
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common operative procedure performed in the United States accounting for 24.4% of
births in 1999 and has been identified as an overused procedure. As such lower rates
represent better quality because a safe vaginal birth is associated with less risk to mother
and baby.2 The Agency for Health Care Research and Quality propose a benchmark of
15 cesarean sections per 100 deliveries. 3 While"there is some controversy over setting a
target rate of 15%, there is consensus that a safe vaginal delivery is better than a cesarean
delivery (Sach et aI. 1999).
The main indications for a cesarean delivery are a prior cesarean delivery, dystocia4,
breech presentation and fetal distress (Oleske et aI., 1991 and Sach et aI., 1999). In
addition, there are also non-medical reasons to explain the cesarean delivery rate, such as
the physicians practicing defensive medicine because of fears of malpractice suits (Dubay
et aI., 1999), financial incentives as physicians earn more for a cesarean birth than a
vaginal birth (Gruber and Owings, 1996), and specialization in obstetric practice.
A high rate of cesarean delivery at a hospital is interpreted as an indicator low quality
and high cost (a cesarean delivery costs on average twice as much as a vaginal delivery).
I ask if Medicaid managed care patients increase their risk of exposure to a cesarean
section by going to hospitals in the Medicaid managed care network. CES~ is the
propensity of individual i to deliver by cesarean section in hospital j and is defined by the
following regression relationship:
2 See http://www.qualitymeasures.ahrq.gov/summary/summary.aspx?ss=l&doc_id=227.
3 Both the National Institute of Health (1981) and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(1998) have endorsed the safety of vaginal birth after cesarean delivery as a strategy to lower the cesarean
delivery rate.
4 Dystocia includes disproportion, obstructed labor, abnormality of forces of labor other than precipitate
labor and long labor.
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CESi; =a + flt Xi + P2H j + P3MCD Managed Care + P4MCD Fee for Service
+L t5 ic CES Indicatorc +cij
c
(1.4)
where Xi are characteristics of the mother, Hj are characteristics of the hospital, MCD
Managed Care is a dummy variable equal to one if the mother's insurance payer is
Medicaid managed care and MCD Fee for Service is a dummy variable equal to one if the
mother's insurance payer is Medicaid fee-for-service (Private HMOs are the omitted
category). CES Indicator is a vector of the main indications for a cesarean section: prior
cesarean delivery, dystocia,5 breech presentation and fetal distress.
Given that CES; is unobservable, what is observable is whether a woman delivered
by cesarean section (CESij=I), then the probability of having a cesarean delivery is as
follows:
Pr(CESij =1) =Pr(cij > ZP)
=1-F(-ZP)
exp(Zp)
l+exp(Zp)
(1.5)
where Z is a vector containing all the independent variables shown in Equation (1.4) and
F is the cumulative distribution function for G, which is assumed to follow a logistic
distribution. A logit regression is employed to evaluate the probability of a cesarean
birth taking into account the effects of hospital characteristics, the woman's age and race,
presence of labor and delivery complications and the patient's insurance payer (Medicaid
managed care, Medicaid fee-for-service or private HMO).
5 Dystocia includes disproportion, obstructed labor, abnormality of forces of labor other than precipitate
labor and long labor.
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There is mixed evidence in the literature that Medicaid enrollees have higher rates of
cesarean deliveries. Dubay et al. (1999) find evidence that physicians practice defensive ,
medicine in obstetrics that varies by the socioeconomic status of the mother. They state
that physician surveys consistently indicate that physicians reduce their caseload of
Medicaid-covered in order to minimize malpractice claims risk. They say that there is
anecdotal evidence to suggests that this response to malpractice fears occurs because
physicians perceive such patients as both more likely to file a malpractice suit and more
likely to have a bad outcome. In contrast, Grant (2000) finds that being on Medicaid in
Florida lowers the probability of a cesarean by one percentage point, ceteris paribus.
1.5 Data and Descriptive Results
The primary data used in the study is the Acute Hospital Case Mix database, which is
maintained for research purposes by the state of Massachusetts. The data contain
information on all discharges from acute care hospitals, including information about
patient socio-demographic characteristics, payer source, diagnosis, severity, procedures
used during the stay and charges.
The charge data provide the full, undiscounted total charges a hospital billed. Using a
conversion ratio, the Cost-to-Charge-ratio, maintained by the state of Massachusetts, I
can estimate the costs incurred by a patient. The Cost-to-Charge-ratio used is a hospital
wide figure, specific to each hospital for each year in the data.
The American Hospital Association (AHA) annual database for 1999 provides
information on the organizational structure, personnel, facilities and services and
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financial performance of hospitals in Massachusetts. The REZIDE database produced by
the Claritas Corporation provided demographic characteristics for all zip codes in
Massachusetts.
The individual characteristics used are age, race, and distance from each hospital in
the sample. Each individual is enrolled either in Medicaid managed care, Medicaid fee-
for-service or a private HMO. A summary of the individual characteristics by insurance
type is presented in Table 1.5.1.
Table 1.5.1: Individual Characteristics by Insurance Type
Characteristics
HMO
(n=3810)
Medicaid
Fee-Cor-Service Managed Care
(n=2164) (n=739)
26 26
3.59 4.07
Age
Distance to Hospital (mi)
Race
Black
Hispanic
White
Other
29
3.76
28%
17%
39%
15%
27%
38%
19%
16%
42%
11%
20%
28%
The average HMO enrollee at 29 years of age is older than Medicaid enrollees, both
fee-for-service and managed care, at 26 years of age. There are 4 categorical race
variables: Black, Hispanic, White and Other (non-White). The racial composition of the
enrollees varies by each insurance type. Blacks are the largest group in Medicaid
managed care, Hispanics are the largest group in Medicaid fee-for-service, and Whites
are the largest group for HMOs. Distance from the patients' residence to a hospital is an
important factor in the choice of hospital. The data provides the exact spherical co-
ordinates of the hospital and the co-ordinates of a central point in each Massachusetts zip
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code. The straight line distance was calculated between these spherical coordinates using
the Haversine formula (Sinnott, 1984). 6 All else constant, people prefer to attend a
hospital that is closest to their residence (Phibbs et aI., 1993, Hodgkin, 1996). It can be
argued, however, that some are willing to travel further for higher quality care. Table
1.5.1 shows that Medicaid managed care patients, on average, live further away from the
hospital they chose for delivery than the other insurance types. This may be interpreted
as evidence for redirection as they travel further than their counterparts in fee-for-service,
even though their choice is more restricted.
The hospital characteristics used are teaching status, number of beds, presence of a
neonatal intensive care unit, the hospital's cesarean section rate and the average cost of a
delivery discharge. The characteristics of hospitals in the sample are presented in Table
1.5.2.
A hospital is defined as a teaching hospital if it has twenty or more full-time
residents. The number of beds indicates the size of the hospital. Delivering mothers may
be attracted by the presence of a neonatal intensive care unit in case their delivery proves
complicated. The average cost of delivery per hospital is included to estimate whether
higher average cost increases or decreases the probability of going to a particular
hospital.
In the sample, only two hospitals, Caritas Norwood Hospital and Mount Auburn,
have a cesarean rate below 15%. Cesarean sections are more expensive for the hospital
than natural births as they require more services and extra time in the hospital. However,
6 See also http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/geo/gisfaq?Q5.1.
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physicians may prefer to perform a cesarean section than allow a natural birth as it
minimizes the risk of complications during delivery. Higher cesarean rates are
interpreted as a bad quality indicator.
Table 1.5.2: Hospital Characteristics
Cesarean Average Teaching Neonatal Hospital
Hospital Name Sections Cost Hospital IC Unit Beds
Cambridge Health Alliance 0.24 8876' 1 0 269
Massachusetts General Hospital 0.19 4543 1 1 853
Brigham And Women's Hospital 0.20 4401 1 1 684
New England Medical Center 0.16 4085 1 1 323
Boston Medical Center 0.19 4047 1 1 354
Beth Israel Deaconess Med Center 0.20 3788 1 1 589
Newton-Wellesley Hospital 0.24 3287 1 1 228
St Elizabeth's Medical Center 0.19 3076 1 1 247
South Shore Hospital 0.24 2566 0 0 244
Mount Auburn Hospital 0.09 2457 1
°
172
Caritas Norwood Hospital 0.10 2243
° °
329
Melrose-Wakefield Hospital 0.28 1822
° °
521
1.6 Empirical Results
Before estimating the choice model, I compare cost of care and resource use across
insurance payers. Medicaid managed care has the highest average cost of all payers for
each year. A potential explanation may be that Medicaid managed care enrollees have
worse health conditions than those in the other insurance groups. To investigate this
possibility I construct an "adjusted" average cost, where the average cost of each payer is
7 The distribution of costs for Cambridge Health Alliance is skewed to the right with over 55% of
discharges costing more than $8,000.
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adjusted using a standardized DRG8 distribution. If the case mix is indeed an important
factor for cost differentials across payer groups, those differences should be reduced
somewhat when adjusted average costs9 are employed. Table 1.6.1 shows the deflated10
unadjusted and adjusted average cost per maternal discharge by insurance type from 1996
to 1999.
Table 1.6.1: Unadjusted & Adjusted Average Cost by Insurance Type
Insurance T e
HMO
Medicaid Fee-for-Service
Medicaid Managed Care
HMO
Medicaid Fee-for-Service
Medicaid Managed Care
1996
2525
2546
3194
2537
2556
3168
1997 1998
Unadjusted Average Cost
2591 2685
2604 2627
3065 3283
Adjusted Average Cost
2596 2679
2605 2637
3058 3207
1999
2813
2842
3074
2815
2839
3075
Examination of Table 1.6.1 shows that the difference between the unadjusted and
adjusted average cost is very small, though the cost differentials across payers do become
somewhat smaller when adjusted cost is used. I conclude that case mix is not an
important factor in the average cost difference across payers.
The next step is to look at resource use across payer types. Table 1.6.2 shows the
average length of stay and average number of procedures by payer for 1996 to 1999.
Medicaid managed care has a marginally higher average length of stay than HMOs and
8 Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) are a set of case types identifying patients with similar conditions and
~rocesses of care.
Adjusted average costs are estimated as the sum over DRGs of the product of the average DRG
distribution and the average cost per DRG for each payer.
10 The cost data is deflated using the 1994 medical component of the CPI obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
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Table 1.6.2: Average Length of Stay and Average Number of Procedures by Payer
Insurance T e
HMO
Medicaid Fee-for-Service
Medicaid Managed Care
HMO
Medicaid Fee-for-Service
Medicaid Mana ed Care
1996 1997 1998 1999
Average Length ofStay (days)
2.65 2.78 2.82 2.86
2.67 2.74 2.73 2.78
2.77 2.88 3.02 2.90
Average Number ofProcedures
2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1
2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1
2.2 2.3 2.3 2.1
Medicaid fee-for-service. The average number of procedures per discharge is
approximately the same across payer types. This indicates no substantial differences in
the quantity of care across payer types. Together Tables 1.6.1 and 1.6.2 show that more
is spent on Medicaid managed care patients as their higher costs cannot be explained by
the severity of patients treated or by the quantity of services received. Therefore the
network has not been successful in controlling costs.
1.6.1 Empirical Evidence of Redirection
After estimating McFadden's choice model using a conditionallogit regression,11 I
calculate the probability of a representative individual going to a particular hospital
depending on their insurance type. If people, identical in all characteristics, except
insurance type, have different probabilities of going to the same hospital, this is
interpreted as evidence of redirection. Using the average age and average distance to all
hospitals for each race category separately, I calculate the predicted probabilities of going
to each hospital by insurance type. Appendix 1.2 shows the probabilities for all hospitals
11 The estimated coefficients for the conditionallogit regressions are presented in Appendix 3
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included in the empirical model by insurance type. Table 1.6.1.1 is a subset of Appendix
1.2 showing only the hospitals attended by Medicaid managed care enrollees.
Table 1.6.1.1: Predicted Probabilities for Representative Individual by
Payer Type, Medicaid Managed Care Hospitals Only
Medicaid
Hospital Name HMO Fee-for-Service Mana~ed Care
Black, Age=27 years
Melrose-Wakefield 0.0123 0.0117 0.0050
Beth Israel Deaconess 0.1645 0.1654 0.3635
New England Medical Center 0.0488 0.0486 0.0634
Boston Medical Center 0.3127 0.3127 0.5681
Total Probability 0.5384 0.5384 1.0000
Hispanic, Age=26 years
Melrose-Wakefield 0.0056 0.0054 0.0693
Beth Israel Deaconess 0.0342 0.0342 0.2524
New England Medical Center 0.0131 0.0130 0.1024
Boston Medical Center 0.1105 0.1099 0.5759
Total Probability 0.1635 0.1624 1.0000
White, Age=30 years
Melrose-Wakefield 0.0572 0.0568 0.2012
Beth Israel Deaconess 0.1446 0.1525 0.4200
New England Medical Center 0.0932 0.0968 0.1502
Boston Medical Center 0.0677 0.0730 0.2287
Total Probability 0.3628 0.3790 1.0000
Other, Age=28 years
Melrose-Wakefield 0.0065 0.0062 0.0236
Beth Israel Deaconess 0.4244 0.4552 0.8319
New England Medical Center 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Boston Medical Center 0.1144 0.1194 0.1445
Total Probability 0.5453 0.5808 1.0000
There is evidence of redirection in Medicaid managed care. The probability of going
to any of these four hospitals does not differ much between private HMO and Medicaid
fee-for-service enrollees. However, there is a difference in the probability of a Medicaid
managed care enrollee going to these hospitals compared with the other two groups. For
example, a black woman enrolled in Medicaid managed care has a probability of 0.56 of
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going to Boston Medical Center, but a probability of approximately 0.31 if enrolled in the
other two insurance types. If you are in the Other race category and enrolled in private
HMO or Medicaid fee-for-service, you have an approximately 40% chance of going to
the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center. That chance rises to 83% if you are enrolled
in Medicaid managed care.
Next, I assume that Medicaid fee-for-service and private HMO enrollees can only go
to the same four hospitals as Medicaid managed care. The question asked is whether
these patients would choose in a similar way to Medicaid managed care enrollees. In
Table 1.6.1.2, I divide the probability of going to a hospital by the sum of the
probabilities for each race category. In this case, the predicted probability of going to a
hospital is almost identical across insurance types. This indicates that if the hospital
choice set was limited to only these four hospitals for each payer type, I would see
similar probabilities of choosing a particular hospital across payer type.
Given that the utility function is assumed to be linear and additively separable, I
calculate the utility obtained from each of the patient's possible choice of hospital by
calculating the sum of the product of the estimated parameters and variable values. The
model assumes that expecting mothers choose the hospital where they get the highest
utility and the predicted choice is for an individual for whom the unobservable c, which
affects tastes, is equal to zero. I find that 60% of Medicaid managed care patients
obtained the highest utility from going to the hospital they attended. Therefore the
independent variables perform well in explaining hospital choice. The corresponding
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percentages for Medicaid fee-for-service and private managed care are 52% and 50%,
respectively.
I test whether the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives holds for the
estimated conditionallogit for each of the three insurance payers using the Hausman-
McFadden (1984) test. The test is based on the premise that if the omitted choice is truly
irrelevant, then omitting it from the model will not change the parameter estimates
systematically. The test statistic (Greene, 2000, p. 865) is
(1.6)
where s indicated the estimators based on the restricted subset, f indicates the estimator
based on the full set of choices and ~ and VI are the respective estimates of the
asymptotic covariance matrices.
In each case, I reject the assumption of independent errors which implies the
independence of irrelevant alternatives. As the assumption of the independence of
irrelevant alternatives is violated, the parameter estimates are inconsistent and must be
interpreted with caution. An alternative interpretation of the independence of irrelevant
alternatives is not that something is "wrong" with the hospital choices of Medicaid
managed care enrollees, but that the network is not only limiting peoples' choice of
hospital, but also redirecting them towards specific hospitals. That is, the process by
which Medicaid managed care enrollees are sorted into hospital differs from how
enrollees of other insurance payers with greater choice are sorted. To investigate this
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Table 1.6.1.2: Relative Predicted Probabilities for Medicaid Managed
Care Hospitals
Medicaid
Hospital Name HMO Fee-Cor-Service Mana2ed Care
Black. Age=27 years
Melrose-Wakefield 0.0229 0.0218 0.0050
Beth Israel Deaconess 0.3056 0.3072 0.3635
New England Medical Center 0.0906 0.0903 0.0634
Boston Medical Center 0.5808 0.5808 0.5681
Total Probability 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Hispanic. Age=26 years
Melrose-Wakefield 0.0345 0.0333 0.0693
Beth Israel Deaconess 0.2093 0.2104 0.2524
New England Medical Center 0.0804 0.0798 0.1024
Boston Medical Center 0.6758 0.6765 0.5759
Total Probability 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
White. Age=30 years
Melrose-Wakefield 0.1577 0.1498 0.2012
Beth Israel Deaconess 0.3987 0.4024 0.4200
New England Medical Center 0.2569 0.2553 0.1502
Boston Medical Center 0.1866 0.1925 0.2287
Total Probability 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Other, Age=28 years
Melrose-Wakefield 0.0119 0.0106 0.0236
Beth Israel Deaconess 0.7783 0.7838 0.8319
New England Medical Center 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Boston Medical Center 0.2098 0.2056 0.1445
Total Probability 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
further I estimated two additional conditionallogit regressions using only the hospitals
that Medicaid managed care enrollees attend. In the first regression I included Medicaid
managed care and Medicaid fee-for-service discharges. In the second regression, I
replaced Medicaid fee-for-service discharges with private managed care discharges. In
both regressions, presented in Appendix 1.4, I included dummy variables representing a
Medicaid managed care discharge interacted with a dummy variable for the hospital.
Boston Medical Center is the omitted hospital. The coefficients on the interaction terms
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were significant in all cases. The sign was positive for Melrose Wakefield Hospital and
Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital and negative for New England Medical Center. I
interpret these results as further evidence of redirection by the Medicaid managed care
network. Even if Medicaid fee-for-service enrollees and private managed care enrollees
were restricted to the same set of hospital choices as Medicaid managed care enrollees,
they would still differ in how they choose a hospital.
1.6.2 Redirection to Low Quality Hospitals?
The next step is to test whether Medicaid patients are channeled to low quality
hospitals by estimating whether Medicaid managed care enrollees are more likely to have
a cesarean section than enrollees of other insurance payers at the hospitals they attend.
The results of estimating equation (4) are presented as odds ratios in Table 1.6.2.1.
Column (1) excludes the insurance payer variables and column (2) shows the full
specification. The odds ratio for Medicaid managed care and Medicaid fee-for-service
are insignificantly different from zero. This implies that Medicaid patients, both
managed care and fee-for-service are not more likely to have a cesarean section than
private HMO patients. Therefore, I conclude that Medicaid patients are not sent to low
quality hospitals.
As the probability of delivery complications increases with age, I create seven age
categories: less than 20 years of age (omitted category), 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-
44, and 45 and older. In both columns the age variables and indications for a cesarean
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Table 1.6.2.1: Logit Estimation of the Probability of Delivering by Cesarean Section
Independent Variables
(1) (2)
Excludes Full Specification
Insurance Payer
Insurance Status
Medicaid Managed Care 0.87
(0.09)
Medicaid Fee-for-Service 0.86
(0.08)
Age
20-24 1.11 1.11
(0.19) (0.19)
25-29 1.32 1.29
(0.21) (0.21)
30-34 1.85 1.77
(0.29)* (0.28)*
35-39 2.12 2.03
(0.35)* (0.34)*
40-44 2.76 2.63
(0.59)* (0.57)*
>=45 4.14 3.92
(2.49)* (2.36)
Race
Hispanic 1.10 1.15
(0.17) (0.17)
Black 1.11 1.15
(0.10) (0.11)
Other (non-White) 1.03 1.06
(0.09) (0.09)
Hospital Characteristics
# of Hospital Beds 1.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit 1.01 1.00
(0.10) (0.10)
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Table 1.6.2.1: Logit Estimation of the Probability of Delivering by Cesarean
Section, cont'd
Independent Variables
Indications for Cesarean
Previous Cesarean
Breech Presentation
Dystocia
Fetal Distress
(1)
Excludes
Insurance Payer
15.00
(2.02)*
45.95
(13.59)*
6.46
(0.94)*
4.04
(1.22)*
(2)
Full Specification
15.11
(2.04)*
46.00
(13.60)*
6.46
(0.94)*
4.11
(1.24)*
section are significantly greater than one. The only difference is that the age category 45
and older is significant in column (1) and insignificant in column (2). Understandably,
the odds of having a cesarean section increase with age. In terms of the medical
indicators, the odds are greatest if the baby is in breech position, followed by whether the
mother had a previous section, dystocia and fetal distress.
1.7 Discussion
Using McFadden's choice model, the empirical estimation found that Medicaid
managed care patients are directed to hospitals that others with the same characteristics
except insurance payer would be less likely to choose. This is interpreted as evidence of
redirection. As the independence of irrelevant alternatives does not hold, the parameter
estimates are biased and must be interpreted with caution.
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There is no evidence that Medicaid managed care enrollees are sent to low quality
hospitals. Using the rate of cesarean section deliveries at a hospital, I find that Medicaid
patients do not face a higher risk of having a cesarean section than private HMO patients.
Overall the evidence shows that Medicaid managed care in Massachusetts has created
a network of providers without compromising on quality. This is good news for those
who feared that the creation of a hospital network with an emphasis on cost cutting would
lead to lower quality care for Medicaid managed care patients. In fact, there is no
evidence that the network has been successful in terms of cost cutting.
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Appendix 1.1: Discharges from Acute-Care Hospitals in Suffolk County by
Insurance Type, 1999
Medicaid
Hos ital Name
Brigham And Women's Hospital
Beth Israel Deaconess Med Ctr
Massachusetts General Hospital
Boston Medical Center
New England Medical Center
St Elizabeth's Medical Center
Melrose-Wakefield Hospital
Newton-Wellesley Hospital
Mount Auburn Hospital
South Shore Hospital
Winchester Hospital
Cambridge Health Alliance
Beverly Hospital
Salem Hospital
Caritas Norwood Hospital
Caritas Good Samaritan Med Center
Deaconess Waltham Hospital
Metrowest Medical Center
Milford-Whitinsville Reg Hosp
Brockton Hospital
Anna Jaques Hospital
Tobey Hospital
Quincy Medical Center
Holy Family Hosp & Med Center
Lawrence General Hospital
Falmouth Hospital
Charlton Memorial Hos ital
Total
HMO
1556*
649*
546*
401*
193*
165*
87*
68*
54*
30*
13
9
8
7
7
4
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
o
o
o
3810
30
Fee-Cor-Service
764*
63*
534*
381*
247*
103*
14*
3
4
2
3
25*
o
9
2
6
1
1
o
o
o
o
o
o
1
1
o
2164
Mana ed Care
o
289*
o
288*
72*
7
77*
o
o
1
o
o
3
o
1
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
1
739
Appendix 1.2: Predicted Probabilities for All Sample Hospitals for a Representative
Individual by Race
Black Hispanic White Other
Hospital Name (Age=27) (Age=26) (Age=30) (Age=28)
HMO
Melrose-Wakefield 0.0123 0.0056 0.0572 0.0065
Beth Israel Deaconess 0.1645 0.0342 0.1446 0.4244
Mount Auburn Hospital 0.0008 0.0003 0.0122 0.0586
Newton-Wellesley Hospital 0.0020 0.0039 0.0318 0.0027
St Elizabeth's Medical Center 0.0341 0.1492 0.1173 0.1050
South Shore Hospital 0.0006 0.0000 0.0068 0.0023
Massachusetts General Hospital 0.0364 0.1864 0.1838 0.0833
New England Medical Center 0.0488 0.0131 0.0932 0.0000
Boston Medical Center 0.3127 0.1105 0.0677 0.1144
Brigham and Women's Hospital 0.3877 0.4968 0.2853 0.2028
Medicaid Fee-For-Service
Melrose-Wakefield 0.0117 0.0054 0.0568 0.0062
Beth Israel Deaconess 0.1654 0.0342 0.1525 0.4552
St Elizabeth's Medical Center 0.0344 0.1543 0.1241 0.1170
Cambridge Health Alliance 0.0019 0.0030 0.0012 0.0016
Massachusetts General Hospital 0.0359 0.1817 0.1904 0.0839
New England Medical Center 0.0486 0.0130 0.0968 0.0000
Boston Medical Center 0.3127 0.1099 0.0730 0.1194
Brigham and Women's Hospital 0.3894 0.4987 0.3054 0.2166
Medicaid Managed Care
Melrose-Wakefield 0.0050 0.0693 0.2012 0.0236
Beth Israel Deaconess 0.3635 0.2524 0.4200 0.8319
New England Medical Center 0.0634 0.1024 0.1502 0.0000
Boston Medical Center 0.5681 0.5759 0.2287 0.1445
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Appendix 1.3: Conditional Logit Model by Insurance Payer
Table A1.3.1 Conditional Logit Model for Medicaid Managed Care
Independent Variables Coefficients
# of Beds 0.01
(0.00)*
Average Cost -0.00
(0.00)
Cesarean Rate -50.05
(23.48)*
Melrose-Wakefield* Age 0.01
(0.03)
Melrose-Wakefield* Black 3.26
(0.74)*
Melrose-Wakefield* Hispanic 0.29
(0.50)
Melrose-Wakefield* Other 2.44
(0.48)*
Melrose-Wakefield* Distance -0.71
(0.08)*
Beth Israel*Age -0.03
(0.03)
Beth Israel*Black 2.73
(0.77)*
Beth Israel*Hispanic 0.55
(0.55)
Beth Israel*Other -39.60
(1.93e+08)
Beth Israel*Distance -0.31
(0.08)*
New England Med. Ctr.*Age 0.02
(0.03)
New England Med. Ctr.*Black 4.65
(0.74)*
New England Med. Ctr.*Hispanic 1.92
(0.47)*
New England Med. Ctr.*Other 1.77
(0.52)*
New England Med. Ctr.*Distance -0.48
(0.07)*
Observations 2904
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%
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Table Al.3.2: Conditional Logit Model for Medicaid Fee-For-Service
Independent Variables Coefficients
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit 4.64
(0.87)*
# of Beds 0.00
(0.00)*
Average Cost -0.00
(0.00)
Cesarean Rate -19.25
(8.24)*
Melrose-Wakefield* Age -0.02
(0.03)
Melrose-Wakefield* Black -2.24
(0.73)*
Melrose-Wakefield* Hispanic -3.23
(0.63)*
Melrose-Wakefield* Other -2.61
(0.84)*
Melrose-Wakefield* Distance 0.51
(0.05)*
Beth Israel*Age 0.05
(0.03)
Beth Israel*Black -0.60
(0.62)
Beth Israel*Hispanic -2.55
(0.58)*
Beth Israel*Other 0.42
(0.74)
Beth Israel*Distance -0.76
(0.03)*
New England Med. Ctr.*Age -0.00
(0.03)
New England Med. Ctr.*Black -1.21
(0.62)
New England Med. Ctr.*Hispanic -2.97
(0.58)*
New England Med. Ctr.*Other -32.35
(745,956)
New England Med. Ctr.*Distance -0.29
(0.03)*
Boston Medical Ctr.*Age 0.01
(0.03)
Boston Medical Ctr.*Black 0.98
(0.62)
Boston Medical Ctr.*Hispanic -0.69
(0.56)
Boston Medical Ctr.*Other 0.24
(0.74)
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Table Al.3.2: Conditional Logit Model for Medicaid Fee-For-Service, cont'd
Independent Variables
Boston Medical Ctr.*Distance
Brigham & Women's*Age
Brigham & Women's*Black
Brigham & Women's*Hispanic
Brigham & Women's*Other
Brigham & Women's*Distance
St Elizabeth's*Age
St Elizabeth's*Black
St Elizabeth's*Hispanic
St Elizabeth's*Other
St Elizabeth's*Distance
Cambridge Health Alliance*Age
Cambridge Health Alliance*Black
Cambridge Health Alliance*Hispanic
Cambridge Health Alliance*Other
Cambridge Health Alliance*Distance
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%
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Coefficients
-0.65
(0.03)*
0.06
(0.03)*
-0.19
(0.61)
-0.59
(0.56)
-0.72
(0.74)
-0.72
(0.02)*
0.01
(0.03)
-1.57
(0.63)*
-0.99
(0.56)
-0.97
(0.75)
-0.61
(0.03)*
0.05
(0.03)
-1.55
(0.65)*
-1.73
(0.59)*
0.04
(0.76)
-0.73
(0.03)*
51688
Table A1.3.3: Conditional Logit Model for Private Managed Care
Independent Variables Coefficients
Teaching Hospital -0.78
(1.12)
Neonatal Intensive Care 5.02
(0.78)*
# of Beds 0.00
(0.00)*
Average Cost -0.00
(0.00)
Cesarean Rate -22.13
(5.11)*
Melrose-Wakefield*Age -0.06
(0.03)
Melrose-Wakefield*Black 0.53
(0.84)
Melrose-Wakefield*Hispanic 21.65
(1.06)*
Melrose-Wakefield*Other -1.22
(0.67)
Melrose-Wakefield*Distance 0.52
(0.05)*
Beth Israel*Age 0.00
(0.03)
Beth Israel*Black 2.16
(0.74)*
Beth Israel*Hispanic 22.33
(1.03)*
Beth Israel*Other 1.75
(0.55)*
Beth Israel*Distance -0.74
(0.03)*
New England Med. Ctr.*Age -0.05
(0.03)
New England Med. Ctr. *Black 1.54
(0.74)*
New England Med. Ctr.*Hispanic 21.91
(1.03)*
New England Med. Ctr. *Other -37.30
(17428383)
New England Med. Ctr.*Distance -0.28
(0.02)*
Boston Med. Ctr.*Age -0.04
(0.03)
Boston Med. Ctr.*Black 3.78
(0.74)*
Boston Med. Ctr.*Hispanic 24.23
(1.03)*
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Table A1.3.2 Conditional Logit Model for Private Managed Care, cont'd
Independent Variables Coefficients
Boston Med. Ctr.*Other 1.62
(0.56)*
Boston Med. Ctr.*Distance -0.64
(0.03)*
Brigham and Women's*Age 0.01
(0.03)
Brigham and Women's*Black 2.59
(0.74)*
Brigham and Women's*Hispanic 24.32
(1.02)*
Brigham and Women's*Other 0.62
(0.55)
Brigham and Women's*Distance -0.71
(0.02)*
St Elizabeth's*Age -0.04
(0.03)
St Elizabeth's*Black 1.19
(0.75)
St Elizabeth's*Hispanic 23.91
(1.02)*
St Elizabeth's*Other 0.40
(0.55)
St Elizabeth's*Distance -0.60
(0.03)*
Cambridge HA*Age -0.00
(0.03)
Cambridge HA*Black 1.20
(0.77)
Cambridge HA*Hispanic 23.13
(1.04)*
Cambridge HA*Other 1.31
(0.57)*
Cambridge HA*Distance -0.71
(0.03)*
Newton-Wellesley*Age 0.04
(0.03)
Newton-Wellesley*Black -0.04
(0.90)
Newton-Wellesley*Hispanic 21.74
(1.18)*
Newton-Wellesley*Other -1.21
(0.90)
Newton-Wellesley*Distance -0.51
(0.05)*
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Table Al.3.2 Conditional Logit Model for Private Managed Care, cont'd
Independent Variables
Mount Auburn*Age
Mount Auburn*Black
Mount Auburn*Hispanic
Mount Auburn*Other
Mount Auburn*Distance
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%
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Coefficients
0.06
(0.04)
1.40
(0.88)
20.98
(0.00)
1.67
(0.62)*
-0.75
(0.07)*
65940
Appendix 1.4: Conditional Logit Model for Medicaid Managed Care
Hospitals Only
Independent Variables
# of Beds
Average Cost
Cesarean Rate
Melrose-Wakefield* Age
Melrose-Wakefield* Black
Melrose-Wakefield* Hispanic
Melrose-Wakefield* Other
Melrose-Wakefield* Distance
Beth Israel*Age
Beth Israel*Black
Beth Israel*Hispanic
Beth Israel*Other
Beth Israel*Distance
New England Med. Ctr.*Age
New England Med. Ctr.*Black
New England Med. Ctr.*Hispanic
New England Med. Ctr. *Other
New England Med. Ctr. *Distance
Melrose-Wakefield*Medicaid MC
Beth Israel* Medicaid MC
New England Med. Ctr. * Medicaid MC
Observations
(1)
Medicaid Fee-For-
Service and Medicaid
Managed Care
0.004
(0.001)**
0.003
(0.001)**
-21.560
(10.758)*
-0.041
(0.021)
-3.163
(0.450)**
-2.634
(0.373)**
-2.935
(0.454)**
1.145
(0.083)**
0.042
(0.008)**
-1.694
(0.124)**
-1.928
(0.182)**
0.077
(0.152)
-0.105
(0.031)**
-0.016
(0.010)
-2.384
(0.141)**
-2.461
(0.207)**
-40.499
(3.72e+07)
0.100
(0.037)**
0.875
(0.246)**
0.275
(0.108)*
-0.701
(0.156)**
11044
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(2)
Private Managed Care
and Medicaid Managed
Care
0.004
(0.001)**
0.003
(0.001)**
-21.560
(10.758)*
-0.041
(0.021)
-3.163
(0.450)**
-2.634
(0.373)**
-2.935
(0.454)**
1.145
(0.083)**
0.042
(0.008)**
-1.694
(0.124)**
-1.928
(0.182)**
0.077
(0.152)
-0.105
(0.031)**
-0.016
(0.010)
-2.384
(0.141)**
-2.461
(0.207)**
-33.633
(11998)
0.100
(0.037)**
0.875
(0.246)**
0.275
(0.108)*
-0.701
(0.156)**
11044
CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECT OF MARKET CONCENTRATION ON THE COST
STRUCTURE OF HOSPITAL NETWORKS: EVIDENCE FROM
MASSACHUSETTS
2.1 Introduction
Managed care is an umbrella term for a broad set of actions12 taken by health insurers
to reduce costs and affect utilization. It has been shown that managed care has
significantly reduced the cost of service, either by controlling the quantity of health care
(Ma and McGuire, 2002) or by bargaining for lower supply prices (Cutler, McClellan,
and Newhouse, 2000). Another recent managed care strategy to reduce costs has been to
"carve out" certain health benefits, in particular mental health and substance abuse
services, by offering a separate plan or contracting separately with a specialty managed
care organization referred to as a managed behavioral health organization (MBHO)
firm. 13 Carve-outs using a single contract for all enrollees have the additional advantage
of providing for better management of adverse selection (Frank and McGuire, 2000 and
Goldman et aI., 1998).
12 Such actions include reviewing the services supplied by insurance companies' providers (utilization
reviews) and, if necessary, denying payment for inappropriate services, requiring each enrollee to see a
primary care physician (gatekeeper) before getting a referral to a specialist, and selectively contracting with
preferred providers to create a network of providers that accept lower prices in exchange for access to the
insurance pool.
13 A "carve-out" program is one in which the insurer, instead of contracting with a service vendor to offer a
full range of services, offers a separate plan for certain benefits or contracts separately with other service
vendors for the management of risks. For a complete description of carve-out programs, see Frank and
McGuire (2000).
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Massachusetts has a highly developed and frequently studied managed care sector.
The state government (Medicaid) has created a carve-out to provide appropriate mental
health and substance abuse care to the low-income population at low cost, in order to
ensure that care is provided in an appropriate setting by specialized providers and that the
care is accessible to all those eligible throughout the state. 14 The government creates a
contract for the provision of mental health and substance abuse services separately from
the contract for general health services it provides to the low-income population. After a
competitive bidding process, the contract is awarded to a private managed behavioral
health organization (MBHO). This is referred to in the literature as a "retail" carve-out.
See Appendix 2.1 for a more detailed description of the creation of the Medicaid carve-
out in Massachusetts.
The MBHO does not provide the services directly, but contracts selectively with
hospitals throughout the region to provide mental health and substance abuse services to
the specific population. A comprehensive per diem rate is negotiated between the
MBHO and hospitals. In return for lowering their prices, hospitals gain access to a large
pool of insured members. 15 The MBHO establishes protocols of care that hospitals are
expected to adhere to when treating the contracted population. Hospitals that do not
follow these norms may find themselves under pressure from the MBHO as they review
admissions, length of stay, and services supplied to members at network hospitals. In
14 Prior to the carve-out being implemented in 1992, the government was concerned not only with the rate
at which costs of these services were increasing, but with the bias toward institutionalization within mental
health and substance abuse spending. There was also recognition that primary care clinicians rarely had
sufficient training and skills to assess mental health and substance abuse problems appropriately and that
they might make poor decisions about needed care (Rochefort, 1999).
15 Contracting with the MBHO does not prevent the hospital from also contracting with higher paying
vendors.
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some cases, hospitals may be dropped from the network if they persistently ignore
network protocols of care. In summary, the creation of a network of hospitals by the
MBHO is expected to lead to reduction in both price and quantity, thereby reducing the
costs of the covered services.
This hypothesis that the creation of a network of hospitals will reduce costs and
quantity of service assumes that the MBHO has sufficient market power to achieve a
reduction in both price and quantity. However, hospitals are not distributed evenly
throughout Massachusetts, and therefore all markets within the state are not equally
competitive. The MBHO is contractually obliged to create a statewide network, so
contracting hospitals are dispersed throughout the state, with varying degrees of
competitiveness of hospital markets. 16 Fisher et al. (1999) find in their study of the
Massachusetts Medicaid carve-out that the MBHO took the geographic dispersion of
hospitals into account when deciding which hospitals to include in the network. If there
are few or no alternative hospitals close to those already in the network, I would expect
these hospitals to have more market power and be able to negotiate higher prices than
hospitals in more competitive markets. It may also be the case that providers in highly
concentrated markets are less likely to heed the network protocols for the quantity of
treatment per episode. Under such circumstances, the network would achieve less cost
savings in terms of price and quantity. In this case, I would conclude that networks more
effective in areas of low hospital concentration. If I find that price and quantity are
16 The Massachusetts Behavioral Health Partnership (the Partnership), current holder of the carve-out
contract, states in its provider handbook that members seeking care must be able to access one hospital
within 45 miles or 60 minutes drive/travel time of residence.
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independent of market concentration, then I would conclude that the carve-out through
the creation of networks can reduce the service costs independent of market power.
I use data from the Massachusetts health-care system to examine how the ability of a
MBHO network to reduce costs, in terms of lower price and quantity, is affected by the
concentration of providers in the market. I hypothesize that the network will achieve
fewer costs savings from hospitals in more concentrated markets. I find that Boston, the
most competitive market, is the only area where quantity increases as the competitiveness
of the market decreases. For markets outside of Boston, I find that hospital-level
variables rather than market concentration affect the quantity of care provided to carve-
out enrollees. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 2.3 examines three
mechanisms of market conditions in which price and quantity are set: the mark-up
mechanism, the bargaining mechanism, and the monopsony quantity-setting mechanism.
Section 2.4 provides data and variable definitions. Section 2.5 gives descriptive results.
Section 2.6 gives estimation results; and section 2.7 concludes with a discussion of the
findings.
2.2 Managed Care: Price, Quantity, and Market Concentration
I first review the literature on the performance of MBHO carve-outs in terms of price
and quantity of care. The remaining relevant literature consists of two sets of paper. The
first addresses the success of managed care in achieving price and quantity reductions
emphasizing the experience in Massachusetts. The second group examines the effect of
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market concentration on prices negotiated between managed care organizations (health
and behavioral health) and hospitals.
2.2.1 The Performance of Price and Quantity in Carve-Outs
There has been consensus in the literature regarding the reduction in price and
quantity associated with carve-outs. Goldman et a1. (1998), Sturm (1997), Dickey et a1.
(1996), and Huskamp (1999)17 find that the number of inpatient discharges has gone
down while the number of outpatient days has gone up, reflecting a switch to less
resource-intensive care. In addition, the length of stay for inpatient discharges has gone
down (Dickey et aI., 1996, Goldman et aI., 1998, and Sturm, 1997). Dickeyet aI., Sturm
(1997), and Ma and McGuire (1998) state that the reduction in inpatient expenditures is a
function of the lower negotiated rates with hospitals in the network. Lindrooth et a1.
(2002) show that 30% of the reduction in inpatient expenditures achieved by the
Medicaid carve-out in Massachusetts, between 1991 and 1995, was due to provider
selection. They estimate that utilization management accounted for 65% of the reduction
in inpatient expenditures. Goldman et a1. (1998) and Sturm (1997) find that in contrast to
other types of managed care, the adoption of carve-outs has led to increased access to
care for enrollees.
17 Dickey et al. 's (1996) work focuses on the Medicaid carve-out for mental health and substance abuse
services in Massachusetts using data from 1990 to 1994. Huskamp (1999) and Ma and McGuire (1998)
examine the mental health and substance abuse carve-out for state employees in Massachusetts from 1991
to 1995 and 1992 to 1995, respectively.
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2.2.2 Managed Care in Massachusetts
Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse (2000) examine how managed care, specifically
HMOs, affects the price and quantity of medical care services in Massachusetts. They
focus on care for one health condition, heart attacks, and attempt to overcome problems
of selection. 18 They use two data sources: one from a large firm offering both managed
care policies and a traditional indemnityI9 policy, and the other is discharge information
from all hospitals in Massachusetts, a subset of which is the principal data source in this
study. Cutler et al. (2000) evaluate the prices paid and treatment received for the same
set of diseases (ischemic heart disease and heart attacks) across different insurance
policies. They find that nearly all the difference in reimbursement between traditional and
managed care insurance is a result of differences in the prices paid for particular services,
rather than differences in quantity of services received. In both acute and chronic
treatments, HMOs have between 30% to 40% lower expenditures than the traditional
plan. Cutler et al. (2000) find that the services received are reasonably similar, and they
are unable to find significant differences in health outcomes across plans. They measure
health outcomes using mortality rates and readmission rates within 90 days and between
90 days and 1 year from the initial episode. They conclude that managed care insurance
exhibits higher productivity because of changes in measured prices relative to traditional
indemnity insurance. Although these results are appealing, the authors are cautious in
generalizing their results to all health services, stating that "heart disease, and
18 Once the attack occurs, patients are locked into their plan for the remainder of the enrollment period,
thereby minimizing selection effects.
19 An indemnity policy is health insurance under which the insurer's liability is determined by a fixed
predetermined amount for a covered event.
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particularly a heart attack, is a life-threatening event that demands immediate action;
providers' practices might not differ as much according to the patient's insurance status
as other diseases."
Ma and McGuire (2002) study a carve-out for mental health and substance abuse
services for state employees in Massachusetts from 1992 to 1995. In contrast to Cutler et
al. (2000), they find that the creation of a network also resulted in a sharp fall in the
quantity per episode of care. They argue that the reason both price and quantity fell is
that participation in a network confers an economic benefit on providers. In return for
participation in the network, the plan expects providers to adhere to its protocols, in
particular, to try to provide at most a certain number of outpatient visits in an episode of
care. A provider that routinely exceeds the target number of visits may be penalized by
the plan's attempt to direct patients to other providers within its network. On the
assumption that the market for health care providers is imperfectly competitive, the threat
of the network to divert patients has a strong effect on the provider's choice of treatment.
Ma and McGuire's (2002) empirical results show that network incentives account for
most of the quantity reduction due to managed care.
2.2.3 Managed Care and Market Concentration
Cutler et al. (2000) and Ma and McGuire (2002) study state-wide average effects and
do not examine the potential effect of market concentration on the ability of managed
care, and hence networks, to obtain price and quantity reductions. Previous literature that
has examined the effect of market concentration on price within managed care has
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focused on Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) and Health Maintenance
Organizations20 (HMOs) and contracting for general hospital services. The general
result is that PPOs and HMOs pay a higher price to hospitals located in less competitive
markets, when controlling for other factors. The hypothesis that PPOs and HMOs pay
more to hospitals in less competitive markets has been tested with generally consistent
findings.
Using a reduced form equation, Melnick et al. (1992) examine the effect of market
structure on selective contracting by a PPO on a cross-section of hospital prices,
specifically, the per diem price paid by a Blue Cross PPO in California to providers in
1987. Controlling for hospital characteristics such as ownership, teaching, relative
costliness, and Medicare and Medicaid shares of patient days, they measure market
structure by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). They include the bargaining
strength of the hospital and the PPO measured as the PPO share of the hospital's total
days of care and as the hospital's share of the PPO days within its market, respectively.
Melnick et al. (1992) find that the presence of more hospitals within an area allowed the
PPO to negotiate for a lower price, apparently by credibly threatening to send its patients
to other providers. The larger the percentage of a hospital's total patient days accounted
for by the PPO, the greater the leverage the PPO had with the hospital. The larger the
share of the PPO's patients in a market using a particular hospital, the higher the price the
PPO paid to that hospital. As the HHI increased, which implies fewer competitors, the
20 A PPO is an arrangement under which an enrollee is given financial incentives (e.g., no co-payments) to
seek care from selected physicians and hospitals with which the payer has contracted. A HMO is an
organization which, in return for a prepaid premium, provides an enrollee with comprehensive health
benefits for a given period of time.
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PPO paid more. An increase in the HID from 0.33 to 0.50 accounted for a 9% increase in
prices. Therefore, the more dependent the PPO was on a hospital, the weaker the PPO's
bargaining position.
Keeler, Melnick, and Zwanziger (1999) use time series and cross-section methods to
investigate changes in the nature of hospital competition and its effect on hospital prices
from 1986 to 1994. They find an increase in the impact of market concentration on
hospital pricing behavior over time, with prices being higher in less competitive areas.
However, there was little change in market concentration as measured by the HHI over
time. They suggest this might have been due to changes in the style of competition
resulting from the growth in managed care and tougher bargaining.
Town and Vistnes (1999) ask how the composition of a managed care plan's network
affects hospitals' pricing incentives and how the preferences of plans' enrollees for
particular hospitals affect the plan's network-formation strategy and thus hospital prices.
They find that a hospital's bargaining power depends on the hospital's incremental value
to a health plan's networks, and that incremental value is determined either by the plan's
opportunity cost of replacing the hospital with another hospital outside its network, or by
dropping the hospital and relying on a smaller hospital network. They argue that hospital
competition should be viewed as competition for a spot in a health plan's network, and
that the extent to which one hospital competes with another depends on which hospitals
are already in the network and how each hospital complements other hospitals in the
network.
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Brooks, Dor, and Wong (1997) regard the hospital and insurer as bargaining over
price for a single surgical procedure, appendectomy. To implement a Nash bargaining
model empirically, they estimate the highest price an insurer is willing to pay and the
minimum price a hospital will accept. In contrast to other studies that use all admissions,
they calculate the HHI based on appendectomy cases only. 21 They find that more
hospitals in the market result in actual prices closer to the hospital minimum. Controlling
for the number of hospitals, and if there is no dominant hospital, they find that health
plans are able to negotiate lower prices relative to the minimums. In addition, larger
plans, in terms of absolute price or as a percent of the market, are able to negotiate
relatively lower prices.
To summarize, the literature shows that managed care has brought about a price
decrease independent of the type of managed care provided in Massachusetts. A
reduction in quantity was found for a mental health and substance abuse carve-out, but
not for treatment of heart attack. Other studies using non-Massachusetts data have found
that market concentration is important in the determination of prices and has become
increasingly so over time. The question that has not yet been addressed is whether the
network effect in managed care dominates the effect of market concentration. Is the size
of the price and quantity reduction dependent on market concentration? I investigate
whether market concentration in various market settings helps to explain the variation in
21 They argue that this avoids a bias that can arise from using all hospital admissions since there is much
variation in the mix of services and procedures offered by a hospital in any given market area. This
argument is not persuasive. Given that the insurer in this case bargains with hospitals over a broad range of
health services, rather than individual health services, all hospital admissions should be included in the
calculation of HHI.
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price and quantity reductions seen across hospitals in the Massachusetts Medicaid carve-
out. In the next section, I outline the theoretical basis for the estimation procedures.
2.3 Price and Quantity Setting by Network Hospitals
To investigate the effect of market structure on the performance of the Massachusetts
Medicaid carve-out, I examine two alternative mechanisms for price: a mark-up
mechanism and a bargaining mechanism. By estimating alternative price mechanisms, I
can check the robustness of my findings to the specification chosen. I also examine
quantity setting using a monopsony mechanism. The three mechanisms are used to test
under what market conditions the degree of market concentration will affect price and
quantity and are not nested. In all settings, I assume that the hospital faces excess
capacity, which is supported in the data.
2.3.1 Mark-Up Approach to Price Setting
The first approach is a mark-up model, where the hospital operating in an imperfectly
competitive market has some market power to set price above marginal cost. The price
mark-up is represented by the Lerner Index,22 the ratio between the profit margin (price
minus marginal cost) and the price, which is inversely proportional to the demand
elasticity (Tirole, 1988, pp. 66). I assume that the elasticity of demand is a function of
22 Lerner (1934) showed that the optimum markup for a monopolist is found by setting price such that the
relative markup is equal to the inverse of the elasticity of demand.
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market structure and hospital characteristics. This model predicts, and I test, whether the
mark-up will depend on market concentration. I estimate the following model:
(2.1)
where Pht is the per diem received by hospital h, in fiscal year t, from the MBHO, and Cht
is the marginal cost of a discharge at h in fiscal year t. Hospitals report charges in my
data. I approximate marginal cost using a conversion ratio of costs to charges determined
by reporting to the Division of Health Care Finance and Policy in Massachusetts.23 Y is a
vector of market structure variables for the market that hospital h operates in fiscal year t.
The vector includes the HHI and regional dummy variables indicating the regional
location of the hospital. Regional dummies are included to capture geographic variation,
such as cost of living differences and the ease with which distance to the hospital
requirements are fulfilled. X is a vector of hospital characteristics including the number
of beds, whether the hospital is a member of a health system, and whether the hospital is
a not-for-profit or a government hospital.
2.3.2 Bargaining Approach to Price Setting
An alternative specification is where the hospital and the MBHO bargain over price
per day of inpatient care. The model is similar to Brooks, Dor, and Wong's (1997)
adaptation of Svejnar's (1986) game-theoretic model of bargaining outcomes. Within the
model, players are allowed to have different levels of bargaining power, which is defined
23 Each discharge record contains the total charges incurred during the hospital stay. Using the Cost-to-
Charge ratio (see Section 4) for each hospital and total charges I calculate the total cost of each discharge.
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as any factor that exogenously determines a player's ability to gain over and above the
payoff that would result if no agreement is reached (disagreement outcome). The bounds
of the bargaining range are given by the utilities of the disagreement outcome that the
players can obtain with certainty. The disagreement outcome for the hospital is the cost
of treatment, as this is the minimum price that the hospital should be willing to accept to
provide care, assuming it has no bargaining power. The MBHO's disagreement outcome
is the maximum price that is the list price, the charge submitted by the hospital to the
MBHO for each day of the patient's stay.24 The total gain to the MBHO from bargaining
is the difference between the list price and the cost of treatment. The model tests whether
the hospital's margin (the difference between price received and cost) of the total gain
from bargaining is a function of exogenous characteristics, such as market structure. The
model, formally derived in Appendix 2.2, is written as follows:
(2.2)
where Pht is the average per diem paid to hospital h, in fiscal year t, for treating an
MBHO patient. PUlt, is the minimum price that a hospital h is willing to accept to treat an
MBHO patient in year t and represents the hospital's disagreement outcome. The
MBHO's disagreement outcome, PThr, is the maximum amount it would have to pay
hospital h in year t to treat an MBHO patient if the MBHO has no bargaining power.
(PThrPUlt) is the total possible gain from bargaining as it measures the difference between
the highest price that a hospital would have to pay and the lowest price the hospital would
be willing to accept for treating an MBHO patient in a given fiscal year. (PhrPUtt) is the
24 In reality, it is rarely the case that an insurer pays the list price, rather it is a matter of the size of the
discount from the list price that it receives from the hospital.
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difference between the price the hospital is actually paid and the lowest price the hospital
is willing to accept and represents the hospital's margin of the total possible gain from
bargaining. Z is a vector of market structure and hospital characteristics variables that
are exogenous to the individual bargaining negotiations between the hospital and the
MBHO.
PL is subject to measurement error. 25 To avoid the problem of measurement error in
an independent variable, I divide Equation (2.2) by (PThCPUtt) to get the following:
(Pr -P. )
ht Lht =a+ R Z + £
(P. - P.) Ph ht htTht Lht
(2.3)
The measurement error is now in the dependent variable and is absorbed into the error
term of the regression. 26 The left-hand side of Equation (2.3) represents the proportion of
the total gain from bargaining obtained by the hospital and is restricted to the unit
interval. To impose this constraint, I express Equation (2.3) in terms of the logistic
function. Let y* = (~t - PLht) and define y=l if y*>O and y=O otherwise. Then
(PTht - PLht)
Prey =1) = exp(a+ PZ)
1+exp(a+ PZ) (2.4)
Equation (2.4) is a logit model with proportion data and is estimated using weighted least
squares.
25 See Section 4 for a description of the construction of PL-
26 The dependent variable is a ratio making any measurement error also a ratio. However, there does not
appear to be a systematic component to the measurement error and so it is assumed not to affect the
standard assumptions of the error term.
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For each of the price models I present two specifications: one with hospital
characteristics only and the other with market and hospital characteristics. The per diem
payment is the dependent variable in the price models. As the per diem does not vary at
the discharge level but only at the hospital level, both models are estimated at the hospital
level.
2.3.3 Monopsony and Quantity Setting
The quantity setting specification examines the effect of market concentration on
quantity in the case where the MBHO sets price and the hospital has some market power
to set quantity. As the MBHO is the sole purchaser of mental health and substance abuse
services for the carve-out network it is a monopsonist for hospitals in the carve-out,
which may confer some price setting power on the MBHO. The extent of the MBHO's
price setting power is limited by the number of other insurers purchasing the same
services for their enrollees. The theoretical approach of quantity setting with a
monopsonistic insurer closely follows the model of physician behavior developed by
McGuire (2000).27 I assume that hospitals face excess capacity, which is supported by
the inpatient discharge database used in the empirical analysis. The quantity of hospital
services, measured by length of stay, is x. The patient derives benefits from medical care
received during her stay in the hospital, denoted by B(x) in dollars. Time costs,
inconvenience, and other costs and benefits of using medical care experienced by the
27 The model is also presented in Phelps (2002), pp.223-225.
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patient are included in B(x). The marginal benefit of x is denoted as b(x) and is
decreasing in x. Hospital services are produced at a constant cost per inpatient day, c.
The MBHO uses its market power to set the price p paid to hospitals in the carve-out
network for each patient day. This practice has become increasingly common in the
United States, with Medicare, state Medicaid plans, and Blue Cross plans setting the
maximum price they will pay physicians for each procedure. I hypothesize that hospitals,
facing a fixed price per patient day, use their market power to maximize profit by setting
the quantity of their non-retradeable services. The hospital faces constraints from both
the MBHO and patients when increasing quantity to maximize profits. The cost to the
MBHO of a patient day is p, the price it pays the hospital. The MBHO wants the hospital
to provide quantity x* where the marginal benefit to the patient is exactly equal to the
price paid for quantity x *. I test whether more market power increases the quantity
provided by hospitals above the protocols set by the MBHO.
Medicaid enrollees do not pay any of the monetary costs incurred from their stay in
the hospital. The MBHO pays a fixed per diem to the hospital to cover all costs related to
each stay. I assume that the MBHO acts on behalf of Medicaid enrollees, who face a
downward sloping marginal benefits curve. The MBHO expects to receive a minimum
net benefit from a patients' stay in the hospital. The MBHO includes the hospital in the
network if and only if the net benefit received is no less than NBo, where the level of NBo
depends on the market structure in which the hospital operates: monopoly, perfect
competition, or monopolistic competition. Figure 1 illustrates the outcome for each of
the three cases.
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In each case, the efficient level of quantity for the MBHO is x *, where the marginal
benefit of an extra day in the hospital equals the marginal cost to the MBHO of an extra
day. The area below the marginal benefit curve and above the price curve for a given
quantity measures the benefit surplus to a patient. The minimum net benefit expected
from a hospital stay depends on the number of hospitals in the market. The patient's
alternative of leaving to receive NBo from another network hospital limits how far
Figure 1: Quantity Setting and Market Concentration
I. Monopoly II. Perfect Competition
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quantity can be increased. In the case of a monopoly, shown in panel I, there are no other
alternatives and therefore NBo is equal to zero. The hospital wants to increase quantity
above x· as it makes a profit on each patient day. The hospital can push quantity to X",
where the surplus gained from consuming up to the point where b(x)=p is exactly offset
by the surplus lost from consuming beyond this point to xm. At xm the net benefit
received by a patient is equal to zero and equal to NBo. In perfect competition, shown in
panel II, the hospital has many competitors. The net benefit a patient could receive from
another hospital is equal to NB*, the entire area under the marginal benefits curve and
above the price curve for quantity x *. In a perfectly competitive market the hospital is
unable to increase quantity above x* because doing so would decrease the net benefit
below NB*.
Finally, I examine the case of monopolistic competition in panel III, where the patient
has several options, but not as many as in perfect competition. Here the net benefit is less
than in perfect competition, but greater than in monopoly, O<NBo<NB*. The hospital is
able to increase quantity from x * to xmc, which is less than xm• Again, the hospital
provides the MBHO (patient) with the minimum net benefit necessary for the hospital to
be in the network. The ability of the hospital to increase quantity above x * rises as the
level of competition decreases. Hospitals in less competitive areas (higher HHI) increase
quantity above x* more than hospitals in more competitive areas (lower HHI).
The more market power the hospital has, the more it is able to increase quantity above
the protocols set by the MBHO. Under these conditions, a hospital in a market with
many competitors that increases quantity relative to other hospitals in the same market
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may be dropped from the network. Using length of stay per discharge as a measure of
quantity, I estimate the following model:
(2.5)
where LOS is the length of stay per discharge d at hospital h in fiscal year t. Again, Y is a
vector of market structure variables and X is a vector of hospital characteristics. The
quantity of care received depends also on the patient's characteristics, which I include in
the vector, P. Age, race, gender, and dummy variables for the Diagnosis-Related Group
(DRG/8 code for each discharge d from hospital h are in the vector Pdht.
In addition to the llliI and regional dummies, I also include practice style and the
percentage of discharges paid by Medicare as hospital-specific market effects in the
vector of market structure variables. I control for the difference in practice style between
hospitals by including the average length of stay for non-Medicaid discharges in each
hospital. Furthermore, I take into account the potential commonality of services provided
to enrollees of different plans within a hospital. Glazer and McGuire29 (2002) argue that
hospitals respond to the diverse incentives arising from different payers by setting some
elements of the services provided common to both payers. Therefore the contracting
practices of one payer can affect the services provided to another payer, even though
payers are responsible for separate groups of patients. I incorporate commonality across
payers by including the percentage of all mental health and substance abuse discharges in
28 The DRG list is a set of case types established under the Prospective Payment System identifying
patients with similar conditions and processes of care. The DRG omitted in the regression is alcohol abuse
or dependence without complications (751).
29 Glazer and McGuire (2002) study the commonality between Medicare which sets a price per DRG and
takes any willing provider and a private payer which limits the number of providers and pays a price based
on the quality of services provided.
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each hospital that are paid by Medicare, which reimburses hospitals according to the
DRG code of each discharge. This mechanism provides incentives for the hospital to
reduce the length of stay of a Medicare patient. The Medicaid carve-out, on the other
hand, pays a fixed rate per day, independent of the DRG code of each discharge. This
provides incentives for the hospital to increase the length of stay of Medicaid patients.
Hospitals will deal with the conflicting incentives by reaching a compromise between the
two extremes. I hypothesize that the greater the percentage of Medicare patients in a
hospital, the shorter the length of stay of non-Medicare patients will be.
I estimate the quantity equation using discharges from the carve-out and discharges
from Medicaid fee-for-service and Medicaid HMO enrollees. If the quantity of care
provided to carve-out enrollees increases as markets become more concentrated, the
coefficient on the HHI will be positive and significant. If quantity of care is independent
of market concentration, then the coefficient on the lllII will be insignificant. Length of
stay for fee-for-service is expected to be independent of market concentration, as these
providers are not subject to the same utilization constraints as network providers and the
hospital has already provided as many services as possible to this patient group.
Medicaid HMOs, separate from the carve-out network, are expected to be less
constrained by market concentration, as these are not subject to the same geographic
coverage requirements as the carve-out.
As quantity is measured by length of stay, which varies at the discharge level, I
estimate the quantity model at the discharge level. This allows the use of the additional
years, 1997, 1998, and 1999, from the discharge data, as price is not included in the
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regression. Furthermore, patient level covariates can be added which will help to
improve the precision of the estimates.
2.4 Data and Variable Definitions
The bargaining model outlined in the previous section requires three price per day
variables: the actual transaction price (P), the maximum price that would be paid if the
MBHO had no bargaining power (PT), and the minimum price that the hospital would
accept for an inpatient stay if it had no bargaining power (Pd. I obtained the total
amount paid by the MBHO to hospitals in the network and the number of inpatient days
for a sample30 of discharges for 1994, and 1995. The average payment per day paid by
the MBHO, which is a measure of P, was calculated by dividing total payments by the
number of inpatient days each year per hospital.
The acute hospital payer, utilization, and discharge database, 1992-1999, which is
maintained for research purposes by the state of Massachusetts, provides information on
payer source, diagnosis, charges, and length of stay (measure of quantity) for all
discharges from acute care hospitals. The charge per day (PT) is calculated by dividing
the charge per discharge by length of stay.
The charge data are converted to cost data using the Cost-to-Charge Ratio maintained
by the state of Massachusetts. This provides us with a measure of PL. The Cost-to-
Charge Ratio uses a hospital-wide figure, specific to each hospital for each year in the
30 The sample includes all of Supplemental Social Insurance enrollees and approximately 30% of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children enrollees. My thanks to Barbara Dickey for helping me gain access to
the price data.
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data. The charge and cost per day are calculated by dividing total charges and cost per
discharge by length of stay. All price data are deflated using the medical care component
of the Consumer Price Index (base year 1994) obtained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
The American Hospital Association (AHA) annual database provides information on
the organizational structure and facilities of hospitals in Massachusetts, e.g., whether the
hospital is a not-for-profit or public hospital, and the number of mental health and
substance abuse beds in the hospital. Six regional dummies were created based on the
service areas of the Department of Mental Health: Metro Boston, Metro Suburban,
Western, Central Massachusetts, Northeast, and Southeastern Massachusetts. Fisher et
al. (1999) justify the definition of these dummies in studying the carve-out because
privately operated mental health services have evolved along with public service areas.
The HHI is used as a measure of market competition. I use mental health and
substance abuse discharges in calculating the HHI as these are the only discharges
relevant to the MBHO. Also some hospitals do not provide mental health and substance
abuse services or vary widely in the extent that these services are provided. The HHI is
based on zip code areas31 from which the hospital draws its patients. A hospital's market
is defined as those zip code areas that contribute at least one percent of the hospital's total
mental health and substance abuse admissions in a given year. Once a hospital's market
is defined, it is then necessary to determine the competitors of that hospital.
31 The construction of the HHI is based on the methodology in Zwanziger and Melnick (1988) and
Zwanziger et al. (1990).
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Two hospitals are considered to be in direct competition if they compete for the same
patient population. In order to identify the significant competitors within each zip code,
the proportion of patients admitted to each hospital is calculated. Hospitals that admitted
at least one percent of all admissions originating from a given zip code are considered to
be significant hospitals within that zip code.
Using only the discharges from the significant hospitals, the market share of each
hospital within a given zip code area is calculated. The zip-code-area-specific HHI is
calculated as the sum of squared market shares over all significant hospitals in each zip
code area. The HHI for each hospital is constructed as the weighted average of HHIs for
all the zip code areas included in its market area. The weights are the proportion of the
hospital's admissions originating in each zip code.
2.5 Descriptive Results
Table 2.5.1 shows the distribution of discharges, days, and hospitals by Medicaid
payer: fee-for-service, carve-out, and HMOs. 32 The table shows that the carve-out
network has gradually replaced fee-for-service as the dominant payer of mental health
and substance abuse discharges for Medicaid enrollees. In 1994, approximately 79% of
total Medicaid days were paid by non-network fee-for-service. By 1999, this number had
32 Medicaid enrollees, not eligible for fee-for-service, must choose between the primary care clinician plan
and a HMO plan. Those in the primary care clinician plan have their mental health and substance abuse
needs provided by the carve-out. Those in the HMO plan are treated within the HMO network of hospitals,
with some exceptions.
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dropped to 35.5%. In contrast, carve-out days have increased from 19% of total
discharges in 1994 to 55.2% in 1999. The carve-out network has expanded from 13 to 24
acute-care hospitals over the same period. It is clear that the carve-out has restricted
enrollees' choice of hospitals: in 1999 fee-for-service patients were seen in 77 hospitals
and HMO patients in 38 hospitals, even though combined they account for less than half
the number of discharges and hospitals.
Table 2.5.1: The Distribution of Discharges, Days, and Hospitals by Medicaid Payer
and Fiscal Year
Fiscal % of Total % of Total #of
Year Medicaid Payer Discharges Days Hospitals
1992 Fee-for-service 100.0% 100.0% 86
Total (#) 15996 170357 86
1994 Fee-for-service 81.0% 78.6% 84
Carve-Out 16.7% 19.0% 13
HMO 2.4% 2.4% 22
Total (#) 11688 113376 84
1995 Fee-for-service 67.3% 66.1% 75
Carve-Out 28.6% 30.0% 18
HMO 4.2% 3.9% 26
Total (#) 11036 108212 89
1997 Fee-far-service 56.7% 60.1% 75
Carve-Out 36.6% 35.3% 23
HMO 6.6% 4.7% 31
Total (#) 10501 95508 87
1998 Fee-far-service 32.2% 37.2% 76
Carve-Out 57.3% 54.7% 26
HMO 10.6% 8.1% 36
Total (#) 11400 96504 77
1999 Fee-for-service 31.4% 35.5% 77
Carve-Out 56.3% 55.2% 24
HMO 12.3% 9.3% 38
Total (#) 13337 114531 79
62
ITable 2.5.2 presents measures of market structure, quantity, cost, price, and charges
by region. The pre-carve-out column contains data for Medicaid fee-for-service in 1992.
All other columns contain carve-out data only. The data encompasses acute care
hospitals only and does not include specialty hospitals in the carve-out network. It is
clear from the HHI that western and southeastern Massachusetts are the least
concentrated regions and hence the least competitive regions. However, there is only
one acute-care hospital in the carve-out in the southeastern region.33 Boston and
suburban Boston are the most competitive regions in Massachusetts with the lowest HHI.
In each region, the HHI has declined over time, reflecting more competition in the
market, which would be expected to have a negative effect on price and quantity. In
contrast, a decline in the number of the hospitals in a region would be expected to have a
positive effect on price and quantity.
In terms of the variables in Equation (2.4), I would expect the cost per day (PUlt) to be
lower than the per diem (Pht) paid by the MBHO, which in tum would be lower than the
charges per day (PTht). In some cases I find that the per diem is lower than cost per day.
I attribute this to measurement error reflecting accounting costs rather than economic
costs. Furthermore, costs are constructed by multiplying charges and a hospital level
cost-to-charge ratio rather than a ratio specifically for mental health and substance abuse
discharges. As the variables with measurement error are only in the dependent variable,
the measurement error is absorbed into the error term of the regression. The lowest
average daily cost per discharge is observed in western Massachusetts, most likely
33 There are no acute care hospitals in central Massachusetts in the carve-out.
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Table 2.5.2: Market Structure, Quantity, and Price Variables,
1992 (Pre Carve-Out) and 1994-1995, 1997-1999 (Carve-Out)
Pre
Carve-Out* Carve-Out
1992 1994 1995 1997 1998 1999
Boston
Herfindahl Index 0.121 0.082 0.093 0.098 0.118 0.018
# of Hospitals 17 4 5 6 5 3
Length of Stay 11 13 12 11 12 13
Discharges 6192 290 293 261 507 380
Cost per Day 710 635 581 528 489 491
Per Diem 696 569 482
Charges per Day 991 942 858 899 836 853
Suburban
Herfindahl Index 0.123 0.112 0.200 0.143 0.185 0.199
# of Hospitals 14 1 2 2 4 3
Length of Stay 9 3 10 7 6 12
Discharges 888 127 199 232 325 384
Cost per Day 570 612 525 539 504 629
Per Diem 573 806 518
Charges per Day 870 923 921 957 886 1176
Northeast
Herfindahl Index 0.161 0.199 0.222 0.217 0.219 0.162
# of Hospitals 18 4 5 7 9 7
Length of Stay 12 11 10 9 9 9
Discharges 3508 1318 1996 1882 2074 2131
Cost per Day 513 534 522 492 470 477
Per Diem 726 409 452
Charges per Day 794 859 843 904 920 906
Southeast
Herfindahl Index 0.233 0.350 0.438 0.508 0.512 0.339
# of Hospitals 13 1 1 1 1 1
Length of Stay 12 8 8 6 6 6
Discharges 888 127 199 232 325 384
Cost per Day 554 555 599 590 574 539
Per Diem 619 467 446
Charges per Day 796 872 962 963 938 959
West
Herfindahl Index 0.232 0.354 0.318 0.297 0.304 0.205
# of Hospitals 14 3 5 7 7 7
Length of Stay 10 8 10 8 8 8
Discharges 2579 212 397 1286 2619 3210
Cost per Day 439 432 459 424 396 391
Per Diem 550 473 424
Charges per Day 697 698 731 721 698 700
* Pre Carve-Out measures refer to Medicaid fee-for-service only.
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reflecting the lower costs of living of less densely populated areas. The charges per day
are the undiscounted list price of the services provided.
2.6 Estimation Results
With the data grouped by hospitals, the standard errors in all regressions are
calculated using a robust estimator of the variance-covariance matrix. The calculation of
robust standard errors relaxes the assumption of independence of the observations and
requires only that the observations be independent across hospitals. All hypothesis tests
are evaluated at the 95% significance level.
2.6.1 Price Setting Equations
Both price models are estimated using a sample of 36 observations from 1994 and
1995. The results for the price setting equations are presented in Table 2.6.1. Columns
1 and 2 contain the results for the mark-up equation, and columns 3 and 4 present the
bargaining equation results.
In the first specification of the mark-up equation I find that the coefficients on the
number of mental health and substance abuse beds in the hospital and whether the
hospital is a member of a hospital system are both significant. The greater the capacity of
the hospital to treat patients with mental health and substance abuse needs, the greater its
ability to increase the mark-up. On the other hand, hospitals in a health system are less
able to increase the mark-up than independent hospitals.
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In the second specification, I add market structure variables to see whether they
increase a hospital's ability to widen the gap between price and marginal cost. I include
the HHI and regional dummies and find that the coefficient on the HHI is positive and
significant. This implies that hospitals in less competitive markets have a higher mark-
up, on average, than hospitals in more competitive areas.
Table 2.6.1: Price Setting Equations, Hospital Level, 1994-1995
Mark-Up Specification Bargaining Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Variables Hospital Hospital and Hospital Hospital and
Characteristics Market Characteristics Market
Characteristics Characteristics
Case Mix Index -0.554 -0.175
(0.514) (1.173)
# of MHiSA Beds 0.004 0.003 -0.003 -0.000
(0.002)** (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Not-For-Profit -0.002 -0.063 -1.087 -2.459
(0.121) (0.139) (0.456)* (0.763)**
Member of Health Sys. -0.383 -0.321 0.251 -0.134
(0.134)** (0.311) (0.298) (0.460)
Fiscal Year 1995 -0.065 -0.187 -0.534 -0.082
(0.130) (0.147) (0.250)* (0.312)
Herfindahl Index 2.739 -0.626
(0.876)** (3.068)
Boston 0.005 1.534
(0.464) (0.683)*
Northeast -0.425 0.753
(0.250) (0.740)
Southeast -0.799 -13.077
(0.398) (235.389)
West -0.545 1.037
(0.285) (0.724)
Constant 0.609 0.069 0.353 0.709
(0.524) (1.001) (0.540) (0.595)
Observations 36 36 36 36
R2 0.15 0.33 0.38 0.52
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
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In the hospital-characteristics-only specification of the bargaining equation, shown in
column 3 of Table 2.6.1, the dummy variable for not-for-profit status is negative and
significant. In the hospital and market characteristics specification, the not-for-profit
dummy variable is negative and the Boston dummy variable is positive; both are
significant. In the bargaining model, the lilII is insignificant. Therefore, if there is price
bargaining between the MBHO and hospitals, there is no evidence that market
concentration affects the outcome of the bargaining process. An important caveat is that
the precision of the estimates may be affected by the paucity of available price data.
2.6.2 Quantity Model
In the first specification I include only market concentration along with personal and
hospital characteristics. The second specification adds length of stay of non-Medicaid
discharges and the percentage of discharges paid by Medicare. In the third specification I
add regional dummies to the first specification. Finally, I include all variables in the last
specification. All regressions include the main effect of the HHI and the HHI interacted
with dummy variables for carve-out and fee-for-service discharges, respectively.
Medicaid HMO is the omitted category.
In the first specification, column 1 of Table 2.6.2, the main effect of the HHI is
negative and significant. In all other specifications, it is insignificant. The effect of
market concentration on the carve-out and fee-for-service is the sum of the main HHI
effect and the interaction of the carve-out with the HHI and the interaction of fee-for-
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service with the HHI, respectively. In column 1, the effect of the HHI on both the carve-
out and fee-for-service is negative and significant,34 which is contrary to the hypothesis.
This implies that as the market becomes more concentrated (less competitive), average
length of stay decreases. Assuming that the HHI increases from 0.3 to 0.5, an increase of
67% percent, the average length of stay for a carve-out discharge will fall from 3.5 days
to 1.2 days, ceteris paribus. The corresponding average for fee-for-service is 5.2 days to
4.3 days and 2.2 days to 0.1 days for HMOs, ceteris paribus.
In the second specification, the effect of the HHI on the carve-out and fee-for-service
attenuates but is still significant. In the last two specifications, I find that the effect of
market concentration on the quantity of care provided to carve-out and fee-for-service
discharges is insignificant.
Practice style and the percentage of discharges paid by Medicare are significant and
have the expected sign in column 2 and 4. Using the results in column 4, an increase of
one day in the average length of stay of non-carve-out discharges in the hospital increases
the average length of stay of carve-out discharges by over half a day. This supports the
hypothesis of a specific practice style within a hospital. A 10% increase in Medicare
discharges in the hospital will lead to a decrease of approximately one day in the stay of a
carve-out enrollee. This result indicates the importance of payer mix in studying the
quantity of particular discharges. I find that it is important to know not just who pays for
a specific discharge, but who is paying for other discharges too.
34 I perform an F-test to test whether the main effect of the HHI and the interaction effect of the carve-out
are jointly significantly different from zero. I perform a similar test for fee-for-service discharges. The F-
statistics are shown in Table 2.6.2
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In column 3 I add regional dummy variables to the basic specification of column 1.
The coefficients on the regional dummies are positive and all are significant with the
exception of the coefficient for southeastern Massachusetts. In the final specification,
only the Boston dummy is significant. The hospital characteristics of type of hospital and
the number of mental health and substance abuse beds are jointly significant for each
specification.
As the dummy variable for Boston is the only significant regional dummy in the final
specification, I investigate the region effect further by splitting the sample into discharges
from Boston hospitals and those from non-Boston hospitals and estimating the final
specification in Table 2.6.2.35 For the Boston sample, the main effect of the HHI is
positive and significant. The total effect for the carve-out is positive and significant, and
for fee-far-service it is insignificant. In Boston, the most competitive market within the
state and a world leader in the health care industry, market structure affects quantity as
hypothesized. An increase in the HHI from 0.3 to 0.5 will increase the average length of
stay of a carve-out enrollee by over half a day in Boston.36
For the non-Boston sample, the main effect of the HHI is insignificant. The total
effect of the HHI on the carve-out is insignificant, and for fee-far-service, it is negative
and significant. Outside Boston, which is less competitive and has a greater range of
competitiveness, results contrary to the hypothesis are found. In all areas, hospital level
variables have a significant impact on quantity setting.
35 The results are presented in Table A2.4.1 in Appendix 2.4.
36 If the HHI is equal to 0.3, length of stay will increase by 0.8892 days. An HHI of 0.5 increases length of
stay by 1.482 days. The difference is 1.482-0.8892=0.5928 days.
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Table 2.6.2: Monopsonist Quantity Equation, 1994-1995 and 1997-1999
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Variables Basic Practice Style Regional All Variables
Regression and % Medicare Dummies
Herfindahl Index (HHI) -10.532 -6.705 -10.247 -7.179
(4.763)* (3.539) (4.809) (4.535)
Carve-Out 1.622 1.461 1.521 1.377
(0.986) (0.962) (1.016) (0.938)
Carve-Out*HHI -1.112 -0.798 -1.349 -0.619
(3.630) (3.454) (3.596) (3.411)
Fee-For-Service 1.270 2.166 1.252 1.644
(0.985) (1.048) (0.911) (1.058)
Fee-For-Service*HHI 5.791 0.698 5.183 2.491
(4.635) (4.379) (4.091) (4.426)
Practice Style 0.543 0.501
(0.097)* (0.100)*
% Medicare -0.116 -0.104
(0.017)* (0.019)*
Boston 2.337 1.792
(0.812)* (0.668)*
Northeast 2.320 0.994
(0.732)* (0.689)
Southeast 1.292 1.013
(1.084) (0.868)
West 2.821 1.425
(0.840)* (0.806)
Fiscal Year 1995 0.153 0.520 0.348 0.613
(0.586) (0.401) (0.560) (0.396)
Fiscal Year 1997 -0.660 0.461 -0.473 0.466
(0.749) (0.722) (0.776) (0.743)
Fiscal Year 1998 -1.150 0.065 -1.043 -0.039
(0.408)* (0.383) (0.413) (0.439)
Fiscal Year 1999 -1.104 -0.344 -1.073 -0.406
(0.517)* (0.355) (0.538) (0.399)
Female -0.182 -0.223 -0.160 -0.202
(0.217) (0.208) (0.218) (0.211)
Age 0.005 0.021 0.006 0.018
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
White -0.664 -0.326 -0.496 -0.240
(0.506) (0.523) (0.486) (0.502)
Black 0.136 0.339 0.103 0.198
(0.448) (0.473) (0.458) (0.470)
# of MHISA Beds 0.040 0.028 0.034 0.028
(0.010)* (0.008)* (0.010)* (0.009)*
Not-For-Profit -0.439 0.520 -1.712 -0.026
(1.099) (0.897) (0.752) (0.685)
Constant 5.393 1.909 4.540 1.485
(1.785)* (2.121) (1.479)* (1.848)
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%
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Table 2.6.2: Monopsonist Quantity Equation, 1994-1995 and 1997-1999, cont'd
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Variables Basic Practice Style Regional AU
Regression and % Dummies Variables
Medicare
DRG425 1.566 1.472 1.492 1.437
(0.813) (0.892) (0.829) (0.894)
DRG426 2.318 1.874 2.351 1.975
(0.744)* (0.847) (0.726)* (0.844)
DRG427 3.941 3.447 3.954 3.546
(0.932)* (0.969)* (0.967)* (0.993)*
DRG428 3.490 3.186 3.963 3.528
(0.952)* (1.072)* (1.012)* (1.092)*
DRG429 11.234 11.083 11.490 11.227
(4.799)* (4.808) (4.836) (4.848)
DRG430 4.514 4.332 4.685 4.467
(0.490)* (0.545)* (0.517)* (0.554)*
DRG431 5.473 4.926 5.359 4.937
(0.467)* (0.482)* (0.527)* (0.552)*
DRG743 -14.454 -14.361 -14.074 -14.049
(1.487)* (1.577)* (1.414)* (1.544)*
DRG744 -0.510 -0.226 -0.173 -0.031
(1.355) (1.268) (1.294) (1.244)
DRG745 -2.996 -2.671 -2.926 -2.637
(0.660)* (0.673)* (0.645)* (0.650)*
DRG746 -8.864 -9.736 -8.920 -9.523
(1.368)* (1.334)* (1.323)* (1.307)*
DRG747 1.583 1.793 1.821 1.961
(1.358) (1.242) (1.302) (1.238)
DRG748 -0.230 -0.703 -0.268 -0.595
(0.947) (0.986) (0.957) (0.989)
DRG749 -12.257 -12.840 -12.522 -12.967
(1.544)* (1.857)* (1.778)* (1.914)*
DRG750 -0.624 -0.311 -0.419 -0.240
(0.676) (0.657) (0.665) (0.641)
Observations 40170 40170 40170 40170
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
F-tests
HHI= F(2,75)=3.80 F(2,75)=3.75 F(2,75)=3.1l F(2,75)=2.15
Carve-Out*HHI=O Prob>F=0.0269 Prob>F=0.0281 Prob>F=0.0503 Prob>F=0.1236
HHI= F(2,75)=3.43 F(2,75)=5.02 F(2,75)=2.28 F(2,75)=1.51
Fee-for-Serive*HHI=O Prob>F=0.0374 Prob>F=0.090 Prob>F=0.1093 Prob>F=0.2284
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%
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2.6.3 Robustness of Results
To test the robustness of the results in the quantity model, I estimate the quantity
model using fixed effects. This approach allows for the control of unobserved hospital
characteristics that may be correlated with the independent variables. Estimation of the
basic specification including only the HHI in the market structure vector of variables
yields an insignificant main effectof the HHI and the insignificant interaction effects for
both the carve-out and fee-for-service. When I include practice style and the percentage
of Medicare discharges, the same results are obtained. The results for both regressions
are shown in Table A2.4.2 of Appendix 2.4. This provides further evidence that hospital-
level rather than market-level variables affect quantity.
The next set of regressions, presented in Table A2.4.3, split the sample into Boston
and non-Boston discharges. For the non-Boston discharges, I reach the same conclusions
as in the previous section. When I control for hospital-fixed effects, the length of stay of
a discharge is independent of market concentration across payers. However, the Boston
sample tells a different story. In this case only, I find that even after controlling for
unobserved hospital characteristics, market concentration has a positive and significant
effect on the length of stay of carve-out and fee-for-service Medicaid discharges, but not
for Medicaid HMO discharges.
2.7 Conclusions
Previous literature has shown that carve-outs throughout the country have achieved
both price and quantity reductions. The question I have asked is whether market
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concentration affects the outcome. I use the HHI as a measure of market concentration
that represents the degree of competition in the market. I find evidence to support the
hypothesis that the price mark-up increases as markets become more concentrated and a
hospital is close to being a monopoly. However, when the hospital and the MBHO both
have bargaining power, price is independent of the concentration of hospitals in the
market. I note that the results may be sensitive to the paucity of price data. I expect price
data for 1997 and 1998 to be available from the DMA in the near future and will re-run
the price models to see whether the precision of the estimates increases. An alternative
interpretation is that Medicaid is a cash-strapped program allowing it little or no leeway
in the per diem it offers hospitals to join the carve-out network. Hospitals in competitive
markets must therefore take or leave the per diem offered.
Boston, the most competitive market, is the only market where quantity increases as
the competitiveness of the market decreases. For markets outside of Boston, I find that
hospital-level variables rather than market concentration affect the quantity of care
provided to carve-out enrollees. In these markets, the quantity of care received by a
patient is independent of market concentration when I control for hospital-level variables.
These conclusions are further endorsed by the fixed effects estimation.
The results indicate that the MBHO can increase the probability of a hospital's
complying with its quantity protocols by examining its payer mix and practice style. A
hospital with a high percentage of Medicare discharges is likely to have shorter lengths of
stay on average. Furthermore, hospitals with higher lengths of stay for non-Medicaid
discharges will have higher lengths of stay for carve-out discharges on average than
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hospitals with lower lengths of stay for non-Medicaid discharges. This is good news for
the MBHO as it shows that with the exception of the Boston area, hospitals are not
exploiting their market power to increase quantity. Proper evaluation of hospital-level
performance indicators enables the MBHO to choose hospitals for its network already
operating close to the quantity protocols of the MBHO.
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Appendix 2.1: The Creation of the Carve-out
In Massachusetts, the Division of Medical Assistance (DMA) administers the
Medicaid program, which is called MassHealth. MassHealth gives participants two
options: membership in one of a specified group of health maintenance organizations; or,
enrollment in a state-run Primary Care Clinician (PCC) plan.
In 1992, the DMA implemented the Behavioral Health Program after receipt of a
waiver under Section 1915b of the Federal Social Security Act. The Behavioral Health
Program is a carve-out of mental health and substance abuse services available to
members of the MassHealth Primary Care Clinician (PCC) Plan, MassHealth Basic
members and those eligible for managed care who have not yet selected a managed care
plan. All others in the HMO group receive their mental health and substance abuse
services within the selected HMO.
Beginning in July 1992, Massachusetts contracted with First Mental Health Inc.,
which operates in Massachusetts under the name Mental Health Management of America
(MHMA) to provide specialty mental health and substance abuse care to approximately
375,000 Medicaid eligible persons. MHMA held the Massachusetts contract for three
and a half years and was replaced by the Massachusetts Behavioral Health Partnership
(the Partnership) in 1996. The program continues to be one of the largest single carve-
out contracts for mental health and substance abuse care.
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Appendix 2.2: Brooks, Dor, and Wong's (1997) Bargaining Model
Assuming that there are two players in the model, the hospital and the MBHO, S' is
defined as the compact convex set of feasible bargaining solutions measured in terms of
utility payoffs to the hospitals (h) and the MBHO (m). It is assumed that both players
maximize utility by maximizing profits. The disagreement outcome, U, a member of
S', is the utility payoff to players hand m (e.g., U h ,U m), if an agreement is not reached.
S is defined as the subset of S' that contains only Pareto-optimal solutions, andU E S .
For all (Uh, Um)E S, the potential gain from bargaining to be divided among the players is
given by
(A2.2.1)
Svenjnar generalized the conventional set of axioms used by others in bargaining
models to include exogenous bargaining power. The solution to the generalized
bargaining model that includes exogenous bargaining power is the (Uh, Um)E S that
maximizes
(A2.2.2)
where Yh and Ym represent the bargaining power of the hospitals and the MBHO,
respectively. Defining 0 as the solution to Eq. (2), (0 h - U h) and (Om - U m) are the
utility gains to players hand m, respectively. If Yh=O, the hospital has no bargaining
power and receives a payoff corresponding to the disagreement outcome. In this case, the
MBHO obtains the entire gain from bargaining, the maximum discount from the list
price, so that P equals the cost of treatment.
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Applying a monotonic transformation to (A2.2) yields an equivalent form in a single
parameter y:
(A2.2.3)
where y is hospital h's share of T, and 0 ~ y ~ 1. In addition, if a set of variables Z
influences bargaining power but does not enter the utility function of the players, then V
can be written as a function of Z:
(A2.2.4)
The hospital and MBHO bargain and arrive at a mutually agreed on per diem rate.
The bargaining outcome is the per diem that maximizes
(A2.2.5)
where ITh and TIm are the hospital and the MBHO's disagreement profit levels,
respectively, and [TI h - IT h ] and [TI m - IT m ] are their corresponding net profit levels from
bargaining. The net profit gain of the MBHO can be written as:
TIm - IIm= (R - K - PN) - (R - K - PrN) (A2.2.6)
where R is the MBHO's revenue, K is its administrative costs, N is the number of patients
insured by the MBHO, PT is the price that the MBHO must pay for an episode of
inpatient care if the MBHO has no bargaining power, and P is the episode price to be
paid after the bargaining occurs between the hospital and the MBHO.
The net gain of a hospital can be written as:
TIh -II h = [N(P-C)]-[N(PL -C)]
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(A2.2.7)
where C is the average cost per episode of care, and PL is the minimum price that the
hospital would accept to provide an MBHO patient an episode of inpatient care.
Substituting Eqs. (A2.6) and (A2.7) into Eq. (A2.5) and simplifying yields:
V =[N(P - PL)Y .[N(PT - p)]l-r (A2.2.8)
Maximizing Eq. (A2.8) with respect to P and rearranging yields:
(A2.2.9)
(PT - PL ) is the potential gain from bargaining to be divided between the hospital and the
MBHO, and (P - PL ) is the margin gained by the hospital. The measure of relative
bargaining power, y, is the share of the potential gain that a hospital keeps as a result of
bargaining. If y equals one, the hospital has complete bargaining power and does not
discount its price from PT. However, if y equals zero, the MBHO has complete
bargaining power and is able to extract the maximum discount from the hospital.
To evaluate whether bargaining power is influenced by measured exogenous
characteristics, Z, such as market structure, y is parameterized as:
(A2.2.10)
where P is the average per diem paid for treating an MBHO patient. PL is an estimate of
the minimum that a hospital is willing to accept to treat the episode, and PT is an estimate
of the maximum payment a hospital can expect from the MBHO without bargaining
power. e is a white noise error term.
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DRG#
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
Appendix 2.3: DRG Descriptions
DRG Descriptions
Acute Adjust React and Disturbance of Psychosocial Dysfunction
Depressive Neuroses
Neuroses except Depressive
Disorders of Personality and Impulse Control
Organic Disturbances and Mental Retardation
Psychoses
Childhood Mental Disorders
Opioid Abuse or Dependence, Left against Medical Advice
Opioid Abuse or Dependence with Complications
Opioid Abuse or Dependence without Complications
Cocaine or Other Drug Abuse or Dependence, Left against Medical Advice
Cocaine or Other Drug Abuse or Dependence with Complications
Cocaine or Other Drug Abuse or Dependence without Complications
Alcohol Abuse or Dependence, Left against Medical Advice
Alcohol Abuse or Dependence with Complications
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Appendix 2.4: Additional Regression Results
Table A2.4.1 Monopsonist Quantity Model- Boston and Non-Boston
(1) (2)
Independent Variables Boston Non-Boston
Herfindahl Index 43.432 -7.232
(16.408)* (3.584)
Carve-Out 5.595 0.859
(1.115)* (1.019)
Carve-Out*Herfindahl Index -40.468 1.728
(14.442)* (3.339)
Fee-For-Service 4.697 2.037
(1.512)* (1.114)
Fee-For-Service*Herfindahl Index -35.118 0.684
(14.636)* (4.207)
Practice Style 0.422 0.640
(0.112)* (0.112)*
% Medicare -0.096 -0.126
(0.033)* (0.020)*
Female -0.150 -0.237
(0.501) (0.235)
Age 0.023 0.022
(0.036) (0.027)
White -2.058 0.220
(0.815)* (0.488)
Black -1.219 0.722
(0.686) (0.535)
# of MHISA Beds 0.023 0.026
(0.014) (0.009)*
Not-For-Profit -0.318 1.609
(1.385) (0.717)
DRG425 0.836 1.700
(1.434) (1.008)
DRG426 2.228 1.641
(1.543) (0.945)
DRG427 5.941 2.996
(1.801)* (1.003)*
DRG428 6.808 2.739
(1.587)* (1.184)
DRG429 5.592 13.299
(2.296)* (6.557)
DRG430 5.479 4.046
(0.922)* (0.607)*
DRG431 4.058 5.052
(0.807)* (0.486)*
DRG743 -11.135 -13.921
(2.999)* (1.666)*
DRG744 -0.355 0.256
(1.007) (1.480)
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Table A2.4.1 Monopsonist Quantity Model- Boston and Non-Boston, cont'd
(1) (2)
Independent Variables Boston Non-Boston
DRG745 -2.202 -2.342
(1.463) (0.730)*
DRG746 -10.351 -9.417
(3.901)* (1.303)*
DRG747 1.963 2.003
(0.583)* (1.437)
DRG748 1.609 -0.988
(2.804) (0.934)
DRG749 -12.405 -12.902
(4.208)* (2.111)*
DRG750 -2.462 0.634
(1.043)* (0.717)
Fiscal Year 1995 1.020 0.546
(0.933) (0.386)
Fiscal Year 1997 -0.310 0.945
(0.878) (0.871)
Fiscal Year 1998 -1.011 0.400
(0.797) (0.438)
Fiscal Year 1999 0.467 -0.191
(0.697) (0.481)
Constant 0.001 0.110
(2.327) (2.192)
Observations 6868 33302
R2 0.10 0.03
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%
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Table A2.4.2 Fixed Effects Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Variables Basic Practice Style Boston Non-Boston
Regression and % Medicare
Herfindahl Index -2.991 -0.424 72.624 -4.467
(6.423) (6.540) (42.526) (7.615)
Carve-Out 1.628 1.310 5.936 0.585
(1.497) (1.499) (3.418) (1.850)
Carve-Out*Herfindahl Index -2.431 -1.186 -46.985 1.569
(5.792) (5.801) (42.263) (6.891)
Fee-For-Service 1.813 1.461 4.794 1.532
(1.503) (1.504) (3.453) (1.876)
Fee-For-Service*Herfindahl Index 1.255 2.460 -33.501 2.192
(5.924) (5.925) (42.543) (7.088)
Practice Style 0.475 0.491 0.770
(0.085)* (0.108)* (0.155)*
% Medicare -0.072 -0.055 -0.076
(0.027)* (0.040) (0.035)
Female -0.084 -0.108 0.042 -0.138
(0.202) (0.202) (0.365) (0.232)
Age 0.024 0.025 0.021 0.028
(0.009)* (0.009)* (0.014) (0.010)*
White -0.183 -0.130 -1.761 0.299
(0.257) (0.257) (0.457)* (0.297)
Black 0.274 0.290 -0.727 0.563
(0.416) (0.416) (0.562) (0.530)
DRG425 1.333 1.316 0.754 1.586
(1.101) (1.101) (1.769) (1.298)
DRG426 1.975 1.928 2.004 1.761
(0.775)* (0.775) (1.375) (0.903)
DRG427 3.529 3.470 5.679 3.005
(0.677)* (0.677)* (1.183)* (0.790)*
DRG428 3.627 3.553 6.713 2.990
(0.976)* (0.976)* (1.864)* (1.116)*
DRG429 10.952 10.964 5.271 13.187
(0.806)* (0.806)* (1.160)* (0.985)*
DRG430 4.806 4.751 5.611 4.522
(0.416)* (0.416) * (0.641)* (0.497)*
DRG431 4.450 4.411 3.654 4.718
(0.495)* (0.495)* (0.731)* (0.598)*
DRG743 -13.133 -13.140 -11.423 -13.185
(3.288)* (3.287)* (6.016) (3.770)*
DRG744 -0.076 -0.051 -0.174 0.119
(1.611) (1.610) (2.681) (1.881)
DRG745 -2.648 -2.630 -2.871 -2.272
(1.302)* (1.301) (1.961) (1.563)
DRG746 -9.326 -9.385 -11.051 -9.333
(4.277)* (4.275) (9.155) (4.776)
DRG747 1.676 1.750 2.034 1.723
(1.649) (1.649) (2.673) (1.937)
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Table A2.4.2 Fixed Effects Estimation, cont'd
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Variables Basic Practice Style Boston Non-Boston
Regression and % Medicare
DRG748 -0.533 -0.520 1.548 -0.881
(1.431) (1.430) (2.635) (1.642)
DRG749 -12.890 -12.855 -11.511 -12.998
(3.076)* (3.075)* (5.130)* (3.589)*
DRG750 -0.545 -0.504 -1.779 0.017
(1.094) (1.094) (1.654) (1.312)
Fiscal Year 1995 0.570 0.778 0.570 0.798
(0.305) (0.309) (0.632) (0.352)
Fiscal Year 1997 -0.321 0.611 0.113 1.420
(0.344) (0.377) (0.690) (0.489)*
Fiscal Year 1998 -0.973 -0.053 -0.263 0.821
(0.353)* (0.386) (0.642) (0.522)
Fiscal Year 1999 -0.739 0.100 2.957 0.423
(0.433) (0.467) (0.978)* (0.595)
Constant 4.101 0.995 -5.869 -1.452
(1.726)* (2.244) (4.499) (2.974)
Observations 40170 40170 6868 33302
Number of Groups 76 76 14 62
R2 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%
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CHAPTER 3
TESTING THE COMMONALITY HYPOTHESIS: DO OTHER
PAYERS AFFECT YOUR LENGTH OF STAY IN A HOSPITAL?
3.1 Introduction
Insurance payers contract with hospital to provide care to their enrollees and vary
widely in how they reimburse hospitals: per service, per capita, per discharge or per
illness, each of which provides the hospital with a different incentive structure in terms of
resource utilization. Length of stay is typically used as a measure of resource utilization,
or quantity of care, as it is easily measured by the number of days a patient stayed in the
hospital and offers a basis to compare the care provided across providers and illnesses. I
hypothesize that a patient's length of stay in a hospital depends not only on his/her
insurance payer, but also on the mix of other insurance payers at the hospital. The payer
mix at a hospital is the composition of insurance payers that reimburse the hospital for
providing care to their respective enrollees. I test whether as an insurance payer becomes
more important to the hospital, that their incentives will have more of an affect on the
length of stay of other payers' enrollees.
I measure the importance of an insurance payer to a hospital by the share of
discharges at the hospital paid by that insurance payer. The commonality hypothesis
states that as the share of discharges paid by an insurance payer increases at a hospital,
length of stay of all patients is affected in the direction of the incentives offered by that
payer to the hospital. Take as an example a private fee-for-service patient admitted to a
hospital for the treatment of a psychosis. Fee-for-service provides the most generous
84
insurance coverage as it reimburses hospitals for each service provided to the patient.
Suppose the private fee-for-service patient lives in an area where there are only two
hospitals that provide treatment for psychosis: one hospital has a high share of Medicare
patients and the other a low share of Medicare patients. Medicare uses a prospective
payment system, whereby hospitals are reimbursed a fixed amount based on the
individual's illness. The question asked is whether the private fee-for-service patient's
length of stay will be shorter at the hospital with the larger share of Medicare patients.
Why should the length of stay of a patient be influenced by a payer other than hislher
own? Most hospitals contract with more than one payer; acute care hospitals in
Massachusetts contracted with an average of 34 payers in 1999. In theory, the hospital as
a profit-maximizing unit should provide services to each patient up to the point where
marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost, which varies by insurance status. Even
though there are a wide variety of contracting practices across insurance payers, as noted
by Glazer and McGuire (2002), hospitals do not establish wards for patients from
different payers. In fact, hospital equipment, availability of surgical and laboratory
facilities, food, laundry, housekeeping and many other functions are essentially common
to all patients using the hospital. They use the term "commonality" to refer to any
characteristic of a provider observed and valued by consumers that is shared across
payers. They argue that commonality can exist because of economies of scale or scope,
or strategic considerations when hospitals contract with both public and private payers.
The commonality hypothesis emphasizes the importance of the payer mix as it will
determine which payers' incentives have more influence on a hospital's resource
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utilization decisions which will affect the entire patient population. Commonality in
resource utilization has direct relevance to insurance payers forming hospital networks to
provide care to their enrollees as it introduces strategic considerations into contracting. If
commonality exists, a payer that reimburses hospitals on a per case basis would want to
contract with hospitals that cater predominantly to fee-for-service patients. This would
allow enrollees of the per case insurance payer to have longer lengths of stay than if they
went to a hospital where the majority of discharges were paid on a per case basis. In
effect, the per case enrollees could free-ride on the fee-for-service enrollees (Glazer and
McGuire, 2002).
Much attention in the literature has been paid to the effect of how hospitals are
reimbursed by insurance payers on hospital resource utilization, such as length of stay.
Recently attention has shifted in the literature to investigating the effect of the payer mix
within a hospital on resource utilization. This paper focuses on mental health and
substance abuse discharges from acute care hospitals for which there has been no
empirical work done in the area of commonality. The empirical analysis uses a longer
time span than previous inpatient studies. An advantage of a longer time series is that it
allows for the estimation of more precise parameters.
I find evidence to support the commonality hypothesis: the greater the share of
discharges paid by Medicare at a general hospital, the shorter the length of stay of all
patients. Similarly, the greater the share of private managed care discharges at a hospital,
the shorter the length of stay of all patients. However, the share of Medicaid discharges
does not affect the length of stay of all patients. A potential explanation is that Medicare
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and private managed care pay for a larger proportion of hospital discharges than
Medicaid. As a consequence of their relative importance as payers to the hospital, their
incentives will have more affect on the length of stay of other payers' enrollees.
Medicare reimburses psychiatric hospitals more generously than general hospitals. The
results show that patients at psychiatric hospitals have a longer length of stay as the share
of Medicare discharge increases. Section 3.2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3.3
details the incentives offered to hospitals by the insurance payers in the study. Section
3.4 outlines the estimation strategy for testing the commonality hypothesis. Section 3.5
provides data sources and descriptive results. Section 3.6 gives estimation results and
section 3.7 concludes with a discussion of the findings.
3.2 Literature Review
The literature review is divided into two sets of papers. The first set reviews the link
between payer mix and hospital resource use in psychiatric care. The second set
examines the factors affecting length of stay in a hospital for psychiatric care.
3.2.1 Payer Mix and Resource Use
One link across payers is in terms of price, and is referred to as cost-shifting.37
Dranove (1988) shows that a hospital will cost shift if it has market power and includes
the quantity of services provided to private patients in its objective function. Furthermore
cost shifting can only persist in a market in which patients are not price sensitive, and
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entry is limited. Dranove (1988) estimates the response of hospitals in TIlinois to a
reduction in that state's Medicaid payments and finds that for every $1 reduction in
Medicaid income, $0.50 was recouped from charge-paying customers. Bernard (2000)
finds that Medicare payment levels are inversely related to hospital prices paid by
managed care plans. The objective of this paper is to test whether there is a link between
length of stay and payers in acute care hospitals. Recent literature has focused on
identifying such a link.
Van Hom et al. (1997) investigate whether a patient's length of stay varies by the
percentage of managed care patients in a physician's hospital practice. Using Arizona
discharge data for a 2 year period, they find evidence to suggest that physicians with high
percentages of managed care patients in their hospital practice use fewer hospital
resources. An increase in efficiency with respect to length of stay is measured as a
negative deviation from the mean length of stay for patients within the same hospital and
Diagnosis Related Group (DRG)38 code. Van Hom et al. suggest that if physicians are
unable to distinguish otherwise homogenous patients based on insurance coverage, it is
probable that they will practice consistent with the objectives of the dominant payer in
their caseload. In the presence of a high percentage and volume of managed care
patients, this suggests a positive benefit to non-Health Maintenance Organization (HMO)
insurers to the extent that the HMOs promote efficient use of hospital resources. A
37 Cost-shifting refers to increasing revenues from some payers to offset uncompensated care costs and lor
lower net payments from other payers (typically, Medicare or Medicaid).
38 The DRG list is a set of case types established under Medicare's Prospective Payment System identifying
patients with similar conditions and processes of care. There are approximately 500 DRGs in the
Prospective Payment System, each of which is assigned a relative weight that compares its costliness to the
average for all DRGs.
88
physician with a higher percentage or volume of managed care patients thus will not only
exhibit less costly resource utilization overall, but will also treat non-HMO (e.g., fee-for-
service) patients in a less costly manner than will physicians with lower levels of
managed care involvement.
Glazer and McGuire (2002) define the term "commonality" as any shared quality
characteristic of a plan or provider (such as length of stay) that is observed and valued by
consumers. They develop a theoretical model to study the interactions between a public
payer, modeled on Medicare, which sets a price and takes any willing provider, a private
payer, which limits providers and pays a price on the basis of quality, and a provider (or
plan), in the presence of shared elements of quality. If the provider contracted with either
the public or private payer, the quality would be different because of the different
objectives and contracting practices. They prove that when contracting with both a
public and private payer, the provider's profit-maximizing quality is a compromise
between the two payers. In this case providers find it desirable if some elements of
quality are shared, and may take various actions to induce and preserve commonality.
They suggest that empirical research can determine whether "practice-level" incentives
matter along with "payer-level" incentives in the behavior of providers. I implement
their suggestion in this paper.
Glied and Zivin (2002) find empirical support for the idea of commonality in visit
duration at the physician level. They examine physician treatment patterns when the
patient population is heterogeneous at the practice level. Using data from the 1993-1996
National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) they test how practice-level
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managed care penetration affects treatment intensity. Practice composition is found to
have a large and statistically significant effect on practice intensity.39 Visit duration is
similar across all patients within a practice, suggesting that visit length is set at the
practice level and does not vary by insurance status. The inability of physicians to vary
individual visit duration may be partly due to scheduling difficulties associated with
variable visit lengths. Visit duration decreases as HMO penetration (or Medicaid and
Medicare penetration) increases for both HMO (Medicaid, Medicare) and fee-for-service
patients.
This paper complements Glied and Zivin (2002) which uses outpatient physician
visits by using discharges from acute care hospitals. Similar to Van Hom et al. (1997), I
use inpatient data from one state, but the time span in this paper is six years in
comparison to the two years used in their paper. I use mental health and substance abuse
discharges which have not been previously used in empirical research in this specific
area.
3.2.2 Length of Stay
When length of stay using patient-level discharge data is estimated in the literature, it
is generally estimated as a function of personal characteristics, hospital characteristics,
and the supplementary variables of interest to the authors. The most common estimation
39 Practice intensity is measured as duration of visit, number of tests ordered, number of medications
ordered, and whether a return visit was specifically scheduled by the physician.
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technique employed is ordinary least squares. I follow the same methodology and
expand it to include measures of commonality.
Frank and Lave (1986) estimate the effect of the hospital benefit structure of state
Medicaid programs on the length of stay of psychiatric patients using ordinary least
squares. In addition to personal and hospital characteristics, they include variables
measuring the restriction on reimbursable days, whether the state has a formallength-of-
stay review program, and whether hospitals are reimbursed on a per diem basis. A
finding that is applicable to this study is that length of stay is positively affected by
prospectively set per diem rates. They note that any study of the length of stay of
psychiatric patients needs to take into consideration the structure of the patient's
insurance coverage.
A change in reimbursement method from a cost-based system to per discharge
payment based on DRGs creates multiple incentives for the hospital's decision to utilize
resources. Ellis and McGuire (1996)40 investigate how length of stay, as a measure of
resource utilization, is affected by such a change in reimbursement system. They show
that changes in length of stay are the sum of three possible responses: moral hazard,
selection, and practice style. The first response is that hospitals may supply more or fewer
services to a given type of patient, which they label the supply side "moral hazard" effect.
The second response by hospitals is to change the average severity of patients seen,
which they refer to as a "selection" effect. It is expected that discharges with more
40 Hodgkin and McGuire (1994) use a similar decomposition to examine the marginal and average
incentives offered to hospitals following the change in Medicare's reimbursement system to the Prospective
Payment System.
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generously reimbursed DRGs will increase. The third response is a change in market
shares. The new system takes into account systematic differences across types of
hospitals in terms of severity and costliness of patients treated that were not taken into
account by the DRG classification. Therefore, changes in the share of patients treated at
different hospitals will have implications for average resource use if there are practice-
style differences across facilities; they call this a "practice-style" effect.
Using Medicaid data from New Hampshire between 1987 and 1992, they estimate
length of stay of mentally ill patients as a function of individual patient characteristics,
the hospital's style of practice, and the effect of the reimbursement system. They find
that length of stay fell by 4.5 days with a change in the reimbursement system. The
moral hazard effect accounted for a 1.8 day reduction, changes in practice style reduced
length of stay by 3.0 days and an increase in the overall severity of patients increased
length of stay by 0.3 days.
Norton et al. (2002) investigate the effect on length of stay of a change in payment
mechanism from per diem to per episode. Their study focuses on Medicaid patients
hospitalized with severe mental illness in Massachusetts between July 1990 and June
1993. Following Ellis and McGuire (1996), they regard the switch to prospective
payment to incorporate both a marginal and average price effect. Under a prospective
system, the marginal price received by the hospital falls to zero, which will tend to
decrease length of stay as each additional day increases the hospital's costs without
increasing its revenue. The average price per inpatient stay may increase or decrease
under a prospective system, resulting in more or less treatment, respectively. They use a
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similar model to Frank and Lave (1986), but include measures of the logarithm of
marginal and average price.41 They find that the marginal price elasticity is not
significantly different from zero. However, the average price elasticity is positive and
significant. The results show that an increase in the average price by $2,300 leads to an
increase in the length of stay by one day.
3.3 Insurance Payers and the Incentives Offered to Hospitals
Commonality tests whether the average length of stay is affected by the share of
discharges paid by insurance payers of other patients. If the dominant payer is a generous
payer or even if it offers incentives to reduce length of stay, but is a relatively good payer
as it pays a generous amount prospectively, the hospital will provide a generous amount
of services to attract their enrollees. In this case the commonality effect will increase the
average length of stay of other payers' patients. Alternatively, if the dominant payer does
not pay a generous amount per discharge or per DRG then the hospital will reduce length
of stay to avoid cost sharing. As suggested by Van Hom et al. (1997), this may lead the
hospital to also reduce the average length of stay for all other patients.
The insurance payers in this paper are grouped into the following categories:42
Medicare, Medicaid fee-for-service, Medicaid managed care, private managed care, and
traditional fee-for-service. 43 These payers represent a wide variety of reimbursement
41 Both studies take the logarithm of the dependent variable. Norton et al. (2002) state that their theoretical
model suggested that the marginal and average effects are proportional, not additive.
42 I omit all visits paid by worker's compensation, non-Medicaid and non-Medicare government insurance.
43 Private fee-far-service includes self-pay, Blue Cross, commercial insurance and other non-managed care
plans. Private managed care includes Health Maintenance Organizations, Preferred Provider
Organizations, Blue Cross Managed Care, Commercial Managed Care, Point of Service Plan, and other
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systems, each with their own incentives for the hospital's decision regarding resource
utilization. The remainder of this section gives an overview of the payment practices of
the different insurance payers. The purpose is to identify the expected effect of the
provided incentives on length of stay and hence the expected direction of the
hypothesized commonality effect.
Indemnity insurance or traditional fee-for-service was the dominant form of health
insurance prior to the creation of managed care. Typically patients were allowed to
obtain care from any licensed provider and providers were reimbursed for each service
they provided to the patient, thus providing incentives to increase length of stay. The
introduction of managed care controlled the flow of patients to hospitals through the use
of primary care physicians as gatekeepers and requiring pre-admission certification.
Furthermore, managed care organizations selectively contracted with a limited group of
hospitals in a further attempt to control costs. Hospitals treating managed care enrollees
are usually reimbursed on a capitation or per case basis, both providing incentives to
reduce length of stay.
Medicare is a federally financed health program primarily for people of 65 years of
age and older and is administrated by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.44
In the fall of 1983 the federal government created a Prospective Payment System (PPS)
to control the cost of hospital care under Medicare. This system pays hospitals on a per
case basis by grouping patients into one of a fixed number of diagnostic related groups,
managed care plans. Medicare includes both fee-for-service and managed care as the Medicare managed
care accounts for only 1.3% of mental health and substance abuse discharges.
44 During the sample period the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services were known collectively as the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA).
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DRGs. 45 As the hospital is paid a fixed amount for each DRG with certain stringent
exceptions, the incentive is to reduce length of stay.
Psychiatric hospitals and general medical hospitals with a psychiatric unit treating
Medicare patients are exempt for the PPS, and instead are paid under the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982. TEFRA payments are hospital-specific and
based on allowable costs, but subject to a case limit. Although the payment is on a per
case basis, it is generally a more generous payment than would be received by the
hospital under PPS. Therefore, it is expected that Medicare patients in TEFRA covered
facilities will have a longer length of stay than those in PPS covered facilities.
Medicaid is a program jointly funded by the federal and state governments to assist
states in the provision of adequate medical care to eligible needy persons. In
Massachusetts, the Division of Medical Assistance is the state agency that administers the
Medicaid program, which is called MassHealth. The Division of Medical Assistance
reimburses acute hospitals for inpatient admissions using a hospital-specific Standard
Payment Amount per Discharge.46 This is a fixed rate payment for all non-physician
inpatient services, creating incentives to reduce length of stay. Medicaid managed care
patients have the option of enrolling in selected HMOs (paid by capitation) or the
Primary Care Clinician plan that is administered by the Division of Medical Assistance.
Patients in the Primary Care Clinician plan receive mental health and substance care
through a carve-out program, the Massachusetts Behavioral Health Partnership. The
45 More details on the Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement systems can be found in Appendix 3.2.
46 http://www.state.ma.us/dma/providers/NoticeProposedAgencyAction-RFA02-c.pdf.
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Partnership reimburses hospitals on a per diem basis, which creates an incentive for the
hospital to increase length of stay.
To summarize the above information in terms of the hypothesized commonality
effect, the greater the shares of discharges paid by traditional fee-for-service or Medicaid
managed care, the longer the expected length of stay of all patients. On the other hand,
the greater the share of discharges paid by Medicare, Medicaid, or private managed care,
the shorter the expected length of stay of all patients.
3.4 Testing for the Effect of Other Payers on Length of Stay
A patient's length of stay in a hospital is modeled as a function of personal
characteristics, hospital characteristics, and the share of discharges by payer in each
hospital. The personal characteristics used are age, race, gender, and DRG code for each
discharge. DRGs control for the severity of the patient's illness. Hospital characteristics
include the number of beds, teaching status, ownership status, and market area of the
hospital. The county location of the hospital is used to denote its market area. I
aggregate Franklin, Hampden, and Hampshire Counties together and Plymouth,
Barnstable, Dukes, and Nantucket counties together due to the small number of hospitals
within those counties. Worcester is the reference county in the estimation procedures.
Payer level incentives are measured by the patient's insurance status: private
managed care, Medicaid fee-for-service, Medicaid managed care, Medicare and private
fee-for-service (reference group). I evaluate the commonality hypothesis by testing
whether hospital-level incentives affect length of stay along with payer level incentives.
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The hospital-level incentives are measured as the share of a hospital's discharges paid by
each of the payers. The commonality hypothesis states that other payers will affect a
patient's length of stay: the greater the percentage of discharges paid by anyone payer,
then the more likely that their incentives will dominate the hospital's practice style
decisions affecting other payers' enrollees. However, the effect can be either positive or
negative depending on that payer's incentives in relation to the reference group.
While payer type may affect admissions, I do not model this process and so the
empirical analysis makes inferences about the length of stay of a random patient
obtaining inpatient treatment for mental health or substance abuse needs. Every hospital
in the sample provides care to enrollees from each insurance payer: private fee-for-
service, private managed care, Medicaid fee-for-service, Medicaid managed care and
Medicare. I estimate the following equation using ordinary least squares:
LOSdht = a l +a2 X dht +a3Ydht +a4Insurancedht + 'L 8jSharejht
j
+asMH / SA Hospitaldht
+'L¢JjMH / SA Hospital x Sharejht + cdht
j
(3.1)
where LOS is the length of stay per discharge d at hospital h in fiscal year t. The vector X
contains patient characteristics and Y is a vector of hospital characteristics. Insurancedht
is a vector of dummy variables for insurance status of the individual discharge: Medicaid,
Medicaid managed care, Medicare, or private managed care. Private fee-for-service is
the reference group. Sharejht is the share of hospital discharges paid by insurance payer j
at hospital h in year t. I include a dummy variable to distinguish whether the patient was
treated in a general medical ward or in a ward specializing in psychiatric care or
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alcoholism/drug abuse or dependency care. MH/SA Hospital equals one if the hospital
provides dedicated psychiatric care facilities and services if it is a mental health
discharge, or if the hospital provides dedicated alcoholism/drug abuse or dependency care
facilities and services if it is a substance abuse discharge. I use the abbreviation MH/SA
to differentiate hospitals specializing in the care of mental health and/or substance abuse
treatment and general hospitals with specialized wards from general hospitals without
such specialized facilities. The alternative (MH/SA hospital=O) arises when the hospital
does not have dedicated facilities and services for either type of care and the patient is
treated amongst the general hospital population. It can be argued that the commonality
hypothesis may be more likely to prevail in a specialized ward, where it is likely that a
certain practice style prevails, regardless of the patient's insurance status. To test the
differential effect of being in a specialized ward, I interact MH/SA Hospital with each
payer's share of hospital discharges.
3.4.1 The Endogeneity Question
A possible pitfall in the estimation of equation (3.1) is the possible endogeneity of the
share of discharge variables. Such endogeneity would cause the share of discharge
variables to be correlated with the error term in equation (3.1) such that
Cov(Sharejht , cdht ) t= 0, thus violating the assumption of the ordinary least squares model
that there is no correlation between the independent variables and the error term. The
result of estimating equation (3.1) if these variables are endogeneous is that the estimated
coefficients will be biased and incorrect inferences will be made.
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The worst case scenario arises when enrollees of an insurance payer in a particular
area all attend the same hospital. Take as an example enrollees of Harvard Community
Health Plan, a private managed care plan, living in Waltham, Massachusetts. Assume
that this group is healthier overall than Medicaid or Medicare patients in Waltham, and
that when Harvard Community Health plan enrollees need inpatient care for mental
health or substance abuse treatment, they are admitted to the Deaconess Waltham
Hospital. As their underlying health status is better, they tend to recover faster, leading to
shorter lengths of stay than Medicaid or Medicare patients. In this case, if the sign on the
share of discharges coefficient for private managed care is negative, the conclusion
reached is that the larger the share of private managed care patients in the Deaconess
Waltham Hospital, the shorter the length of stay of all patients. However, the true
explanation is that it is the better health status of this group relative to other patient
groups that is driving their shorter lengths of stay. In summary, it is their health status
rather their payer status that is causing the negative sign on the share of discharges by
payer.
Ideally one would have patients randomly assigned by payer to a hospital, but this is
not the case with my data. Without random assignment of patients, an ideal data set
would contain objective measures of health status, which would allow me to control
perfectly for an individual's health. Additionally, the data set would provide valid
instruments for the share of discharge variables in order to test whether these variables
are correlated with the error term in equation (3.1) using the Hausman test for
endogeneity (1978 and 1984). The test, based on estimating a two-stage least squares
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model, requires additional variables that are correlated with the share of discharge
variables, but are not correlated with the error term in equation (3.1), cdht • Specifically, I
require hospital-level variables that are correlated with the share of discharge variables,
but are not correlated with the health status or location of the patient, the source of the
potential endogeneity. The data set does not have plausible instruments to facilitate
addressing the endogeneity problem.
In reality, health status may not be such a big issue in how patients are channeled to
hospitals. Medicare sets reimbursement rates prospectively based on DRGs and contracts
with any willing provider. Medicare patients are free to choose any hospital that is
willing to contract with Medicare regardless of their health status. Medicaid managed
care has established a large network of hospitals to provide care to its enrollees. Patients
are directed to hospitals based on the patient's geographical location and health needs.
The objective is to get the patient to the most appropriate facility as soon as possible to
avoid more costly treatment at a later date. Fee-for-service patients are able to choose
any licensed provider. Private managed care may direct severely ill patients to specific
hospitals based on the patient's health needs and the services and facilities of particular
hospitals within their network. However, it is unlikely that all managed care patients are
directed to specific hospitals based solely on their health status.
Although the data set lacks any objective measures of health status, it does contain
the DRG code used for the patient's admission to hospital, which I use as a proxy for
health status. I also include dummy variables for the market area of the hospital to
control for any region-specific effects that may affect length of stay. Inclusion of these
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variables is an attempt to reduce the potential correlation existing between the error term
and the share of discharge-by-payer variables. As these are not perfect measures, there
may still be some remaining correlation between the error term and the share of discharge
variables. I proceed with the estimation assuming that I have sufficiently controlled for
endogeneity to allow for a meaningful regression analysis.
3.5 Data Sources and Descriptive Results
The paper focuses on mental health and substance abuse discharges, identified as
major diagnostic categories 19 and 20, from acute care hospitals in Massachusetts from
1994 to 1999. I use this sub-sample of the population of discharges as it has not been
used in previous empirical work. Also, differences in how Medicare reimburses hospital
with specialized units versus those that do not, allows for additional testing of the
commonality hypothesis. Mental health and substance abuse together make up almost
7% of discharges from acute care hospitals over the sample period.
3.5.1 Data Sources
The acute hospital payer, utilization, and discharge database, 1994-1999, which is
maintained for research purposes by the state of Massachusetts, provided information on
personal characteristics, payer source, diagnosis, charges, and length of stay for all
discharges from acute care hospitals.
The American Hospital Association annual database provided information on the
organizational structure and facilities of hospitals in Massachusetts, e.g., whether the
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hospital is a not-for-profit or public hospital, the number of beds in the hospital, and
whether the hospital is a teaching hospital. The REZIDE database, maintained by the
Claritas Corporation, was used to link the hospital's zip code with the county within
which it is located.
3.5.2 Descriptive Results
Table 3.5.2.1 presents the means and standard deviations of the dependent variable
and the principal personal and hospital characteristics for the sample of 258,011
discharges. On average, patients stay approximately 9 days in the hospital. The sample
is almost evenly split between male and female and is predominantly white. Medicare is
the largest payer followed by private fee-for-service. The majority of hospitals are
medium-sized, with an average of 277 beds. Approximately one-third of hospitals in the
sample are teaching hospitals and about three-quarters of hospitals are not-for-profit.
Table 3.5.2.2 shows the distribution of discharges by DRG. Mental health illness
accounts for almost 70% of all discharges. Approximately 50% of the sample is
hospitalized for psychoses. Alcohol abuse or dependence is the next largest category,
responsible for approximately 17% of discharges in total.
, To assess the distribution of patients, I examine payer characteristics across hospitals.
Table 3.5.2.3 shows the average distribution of payers at hospitals attended by private
fee-for-service, private managed care, Medicare, and Medicaid patients. Private managed
care and Medicare patients tend to go to hospitals where their insurance is the largest
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Table 3.5.2.1: Summary of Principal Variables
Standard
Mean Deviation
Dependent Variable
Length of Stay 8.532 10.436
Independent Variables
Female 0.513 0.500
Age
0-30 0.249 0.433
31-39 0.253 0.435
40-55 0.266 0.442
56-96 0.232 0.422
Race
Hispanic 0.052 0.222
Black 0.058 0.235
Other 0.060 0.238
White 0.835 0.371
Insurance Status
Private Managed Care 0.193 0.394
Fee-for-Service 0.226 0.418
Medicaid 0.125 0.331
Medicare 0.362 0.481
Medicaid Managed Care 0.095 0.293
Hospital Characteristics
# of Beds 277.182 172.162
Teaching Hospital 0.366 0.482
Ownership Status
Non-Federal 0.055 0.229
Not-for-profit 0.756 0.430
For-Profit 0.042 0.200
payer, respectively. For the remaining insurance payers, their patients tend to go to
hospitals where their insurance is the second largest payer. Table 3.5.2.3 suggests that
private managed care and Medicare will have the strongest impact in terms of the
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Table 3.5.2.2: Distribution of Discharges by DRG
Percent of
DRG # DRG Description Frequency Discharges
424 O.R. Procedure with Principal Diagnosis of Mental Illness 1,541 0.6
425 Acute Adjust React and Disturbance of Psychosocial Dysfunction 7,231 2.8
426 Depressive Neuroses 12,432 4.82
427 Neuroses except Depressive 10,593 4.11
428 Disorders of Personality and Impulse Control 2,706 1.05
429 Organic Disturbances and Mental Retardation 14,741 5.71
430 Psychoses 131,489 50.96
431 Childhood Mental Disorders 3,184 1.23
432 Other Mental Disorder Diagnoses 804 0.31
743 Opioid Abuse or Dependence, Left against Medical Advice 4,375 1.7
744 Opioid Abuse or Dependence with Complications 3,617 1.4
745 Opioid Abuse or Dependence without Complications 11,895 4.61
Cocaine or Other Drug Abuse or Dependence, Left against
746 Medical Advice 1,011 0.39
747 Cocaine or Other Drug Abuse or Dependence with Complications 2,876 1.11
Cocaine or Other Drug Abuse or Dependence without
748 Complications 6,100 2.36
749 Alcohol Abuse or Dependence, Left against Medical Advice 5,909 2.29
750 Alcohol Abuse or Dependence with Complications 14,701 5.7
751 Alcohol Abuse or Dependence without Complications 22,806 8.84
Total 258,011 100
Table 3.5.2.3: Hospital Discharges by Patient Insurance Status
Insurance Payers Reimbursing Hospitals
Private Private Medicaid
Fee-for- Managed Managed
Service Care Medicaid Care Medicare
Patient Insurance Status
Private Fee-for-Service 0.29 0.17 0.13 0.08 0.33
Private Managed Care 0.20 0.33 0.09 0.07 0.31
Medicaid 0.24 0.14 0.24 0.05 0.32
Medicaid Managed Care 0.18 0.14 0.07 0.29 0.32
Medicare 0.21 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.44
Total 22.61 19.25 12.49 9.46 36.2
104
hypothesized commonality effect. Medicare is the dominant payer of hospital discharges
paying for just over 36% of all hospital discharges. Private fee-for-service is the next
largest payer (22.61 %), followed by Medicaid (21.95%, fee-for-service and managed care
combined) and then private managed care (19.25%).
3.6 Estimation Results
The results for the principal independent variables of Equation (3.1) are presented in
Table 3.6.1. The remaining results are presented in Appendix 3.1. Column (1) estimates
Equation (3.1) without the share variables, the dummy variable for a psychiatric or
substance abuse facility, and the interaction terms, column (2) includes the share of
discharge variables, and column (3) includes all the previously omitted variables.
The coefficients on the share of discharges give the differential effect of a change in
the share of discharges of a particular payer relative to private fee-for-service in general
hospitals. The corresponding effect for MH/SA hospitals is the sum of the coefficients
on the share of discharges and the interaction of that variable with the dummy variable
for MHISA hospitals.47 For both types of hospitals, I find that the effect of the share of
discharges paid by private managed care and by Medicare is negative and significantly
different from zero. Patients attending hospitals dominated by either private managed
care discharges or Medicare discharges will utilize fewer resources on average, that is,
47 The F-statistics for the joint significance of t5j and ¢J j are as follows:
Private managed care, F(2,88) =3.66, Prob > F =0.0297
Medicare, F(2,88) =10.00, Prob > F =0.0061
Medicaid, F(2,88) =0.36, Prob > F =0.6955
Medicaid managed care, F(2,88) = 0.62, Prob > F = 0.5391
105
have a shorter length of stay than a hospital dominated by private fee-for-service
discharges. The average length of stay in the sample is 8.5 days. An increase in
Medicare discharges or private managed care discharges in a general hospital by 1% will
lead to a reduction in length of stay of 0.04 days and 0.03 days, respectively.48 The
magnitude of the effect is similar for MH/SA hospitals, although slightly less for
Medicare and slightly more for private managed care.49 The share of discharges paid by
Medicaid, both fee-for-service and managed care, does not affect the length of stay of
non-Medicaid patients.
The results provide limited support for the commonality hypothesis and suggest a
refinement of the hypothesis. Table 3.5.2.3 shows that private managed care and
Medicare patients go to hospitals where they are the majority patient group, respectively.
The estimation results show that the greater the percentage of discharges paid by private
managed care and Medicare, the shorter the average length of stay is for all patients. The
incentives offered by Medicaid, which pays for the smallest percentage of discharges, do
not affect the resource utilization of other payers' patients. The conclusion reached is
that the hospital takes only the leading payers' incentives into account when setting
aspects of care in common across all patient groups.
48 Medicare is the largest payer of hospital discharges accounting for approximately 36.2% of discharges on
average at a hospital with a standard deviation of 0.16.
49 For private managed care, the sum of the coefficients is (-3.486-0.135)=-3.621. For Medicare, the sum
of the coefficients is (-4.481+0.920)=-3.561.
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Table 3.6.1: Length of Stay Regressions, 1994-1999
(1) (2) (3)
Independent Variables Basic Share of Full
Specification Discharges Specification
Only
Share of Discharges
% Private Managed Care -3.5 -3.5
(1.3)* (1.3)*
% Medicaid -0.7 -0.8
(1.8) (1.7)
% Medicare -4.5 -4.5
(1.3)* (1.3)*
% Medicaid Managed Care 1.6 1.5
(1.6) (1.6)
MHISA Hospital & Interactions
MHISA Hospital -0.2
(0.4)
MHISA Hospital * % Medicaid -0.3
(0.4)
MHISA Hospital * % Medicare 0.9
(0.3)*
MHISA Hospital * % Medicaid Managed Care -0.3
(0.5)
MHISA Hospital * % Private Managed Care -0.1
(0.3)
Demographics
Age 0-30 -1.6 -1.9 -1.9
(0.3)* (0.2)* (0.2)*
Age 31-39 -2.4 -2.6 -2.7
(0.2)* (0.2)* (0.2)*
Age 40-55 -1.7 -1.9 -1.9
(0.2)* (0.2)* (0.2)*
Female 0.1 0.2 0.1
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Hispanic -1.1 -1.3 -1.3
(0.2)* (0.3)* (0.3)*
Black 0.6 0.5 0.5
(0.3) (0.2) (0.2)*
Other (non-White) 0.9 0.8 0.8
(0.3)* (0.3) (0.3)*
Patient's Insurance Status
Private Managed Care -0.8 -0.5 -0.4
(0.2)* (0.2)* (0.2)*
Medicaid 1.6 1.5 1.8
(0.3)* (0.2)* (0.3)*
Medicare 1.5 1.6 0.9
(0.2)* (0.1)* (0.2)*
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Table 3.6.1: Length of Stay Regressions, 1994-1999, cont'd
(1) (2) (3)
Independent Variables Basic Share of Full
Specification Discharges Specification
Only
Medicaid Managed Care 1.6 1.2 1.5
(0.4)* (0.3)* (0.5)*
Hospital Characteristics
Teaching Hospital
-0.3 -0.5 -0.4
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
# of Beds 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Non-Federal Hospital 2.1 1.5 1.4
(1.1) (1.0) (1.0)
Not-for-Profit Hospital -0.3 -0.5 -0.6
(0.6) (0.6) (0.6)
Market Location
Cape Cod -0.7 -1.4 -1.4
(0.9) (1.0) (1.0)
Berkshire 1.8 0.8 0.8
(1.5) (1.3) (1.3)
Bristol -2.3 -2.7 -2.6
(0.6)* (0.7)* (0.7)*
Essex 0.7 -0.1 -0.1
(0.7) (0.6) (0.7)
Franklin, Hampden, or Hampshire 0.8 -0.0 -0.0
(0.6) (0.7) (0.7)
Middlesex -0.1 -0.7 -0.7
(0.6) (0.6) (0.6)
Norfolk 0.3 0.3 0.3
(0.8) (0.6) (0.6)
Suffolk 1.1 0.9 0.8
(0.6) (0.6) (0.6)
Constant 7.0 10.1 10.4
(0.8)* (1.3)* (1.3)*
Observations 258011 258011 258011
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*significant at 5%, two tailed test
Whether the hospital is a specialty hospital providing mental health and/or substance
abuse services or is a general medical hospital has no differential effect on length of stay.
However, Medicare dominated psychiatric hospitals or general hospitals with a
108
psychiatric unit tend to have a longer length of stay than Medicare dominated general
medical hospitals without a psychiatric unit. A 1% increase in Medicare discharges in a
psychiatric hospital will increase length of stay by 0.09 days relative to a general hospital
without a psychiatric unit. This reflects the more generous Medicare payment to
psychiatric hospitals under TEFRA. It provides further evidence of commonality, as a
patient's length of stay in a specialized unit or specialized hospital, regardless of their
insurance payers, will be longer as the percentage of Medicare patients increases.
The coefficients on the demographic variables, DRG codes, year dummies, hospital
characteristics, and market location of the hospital are robust across the three
specifications in Table 3.6.1. All variables that are significant in column (1) and (2) are
significant in the full specification of column (3). The dummy variables for Black, Other
(non-White), and DRG code 43250 are significant in the full specification, but not
significant in the other two. Some variables become more significant and their effect is
slightly greater in column (3), for example, if the patient has Medicaid insurance.
The reference group is white males between the ages of 56 and 96 with traditional
fee-for-service insurance. I find that patients between the ages of 56 and 96 have the
longest length of stay and those between the ages of 31 and 39 have the shortest length of
stay. Gender is not a significant predictor of length of stay. Hispanics are the only race
that has a shorter length of stay relative to white patients. There is a clear downward
trend over time in length of stay represented by the negatively significant year dummies.
50 See Appendix 1.
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A patient with Medicaid fee-for-service, Medicaid managed care, or Medicare
insurance will have a longer length of stay than a traditional fee-for-service discharge.
This result is counterintuitive as traditional fee-for-service is the most generous payer.
The result may be explained by inadequate controls for case mix, even though I
controlled for patient severity by including DRGs.
With the data grouped by hospitals, the standard errors in the regressions are
calculated using a robust estimator of the variance/covariance matrix. The calculation of
robust standard errors relaxes the assumption of independence of the observations and
requires only that the observations be independent across hospitals. I have evaluated all
hypothesis tests at the 95% significance level.
3.7 Conclusions
The literature has shifted away from the link between price and payers towards
establishing a link between resource utilization and payers. Specifically, the aim has
been to see whether payers other than the patient's own affect the patient's resource use
during a hospital stay. Using length of stay as a measure of resource utilization, this
paper identifies such a link for mental health and substance abuse discharges from acute
care hospitals in Massachusetts between 1994 and 1999.
I find that patients in Medicare dominated or private managed care dominated
hospitals will have a shorter length of stay, regardless of their insurance payer, than
hospitals with less Medicare discharges and private managed care discharges,
respectively. The share of Medicaid discharges, however, has no effect on the length of
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stay of other patients. In contrast to general hospitals, I find that length of stay increases
with the share of Medicare discharges in specialized wards or hospitals reflecting the
more generous payment to specialized hospitals than to general hospitals. This finding
supports the commonality hypothesis that hospitals (or other providers) may set some
aspects of care in common across patients. In conclusion, Medicare and private managed
care are two large insurance payers with a strong emphasis on containing resource
utilization. This paper has shown that their influence stretches beyond their own
enrollees. While this may be good news for hospital administrators, patients with
insurance other than these two may not be so happy.
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Appendix 3.1: Additional Regression Results
(1) (2) (3)
Independent Basic Share of Full
Variables Specification Discharges Specification
Only
Fiscal Year 1995 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
(0.2)* (0.2)* (0.2)*
Fiscal Year 1996 -1.3 -1.2 -1.3
(0.2)* (0.2)* (0.2)*
Fiscal Year 1997 -2.0 -1.9 -1.9
(0.2)* (0.3)* (0.3)*
Fiscal Year 1998 -2.0 -1.8 -1.9
(0.3)* (0.3)* (0.3)*
Fiscal Year 1999 -1.8 -1.6 -1.6
(0.3)* (0.4)* (0.4)*
DRG424 7.7 7.9 8.0
(1.1)* (1.1)* (1.1)*
DRG425 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
(0.3) (0.3) (0.4)
DRG426 1.1 1.2 1.3
(0.3)* (0.3)* (0.4)*
DRG427 2.3 2.3 2.4
(0.5)* (0.5)* (0.6)*
DRG428 2.4 2.5 2.5
(0.5)* (0.5)* (0.5)*
DRG429 4.2 4.5 4.5
(0.6)* (0.6)* (0.6)*
DRG430 5.4 5.4 5.5
(0.4)* (0.4)* (0.4)*
DRG431 6.7 6.6 6.7
(0.6)* (0.7)* (0.7)*
DRG432 2.6 2.7 2.8
(1.1) (1.0) (1.0)*
DRG743 -2.5 -2.6 -2.6
(0.3)* (0.3)* (0.4)*
DRG744 0.7 0.6 0.6
(0.2)* (0.2)* (0.2)*
DRG745 0.3 0.2 0.2
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
DRG746 -2.3 -2.5 -2.4
(0.4)* (0.4)* (0.4)*
DRG747 0.5 0.5 0.7
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3)*
DRG748 0.6 0.5 0.5
(0.2)* (0.2)* (0.2)*
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Appendix 3.1: Additional Regression Results, cont'd
Independent
Variables
DRG749
DRG750
(1)
Basic
Specification
-3.2
(0.4)*
0.3
(0.2)
(2)
Share of
Discharges
Only
-3.3
(0.5)*
0.3
(0.1)
(3)
Full
Specification
-3.3
(0.5)*
0.4
(0.1)*
Observations 258011
R2 0.11
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%, two tailed test
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258011
0.11
258011
0.11
Appendix 3.2: Reimbursement Mechanisms
A3.2.1 Medicaid
Each hospital's Standard Payment Amount per Discharge is derived from the
statewide average hospital cost per admission in a base year, standardized for case mix
differences, capping all hospital costs in the top 25th percentile to the efficiency standard
as an efficient adjustment. For each hospital, the statewide average is then adjusted for
inflation, each hospital's wage area and hospital-specific case mix based on paid
Medicaid claims in the previous year. Efficient low-cost hospitals that meet the criteria
set out by the Division of Medical Assistance receive an add-on to their Standard
Payment Amount per Discharge.
A3.2.2 Medicare
Medicare consists of two different health insurance plans: hospital insurance (referred
to as Part A) and medical insurance (referred to as Part B). Part A covers most inpatient
services, including some nursing facilities, and is free to the beneficiary. Part B covers
outpatient services and inpatient services not covered in Part A, but requires a monthly
premium of around $50. In both Parts A and B, there are two types of plans for each
enrollee: a traditional fee-for-service plan administered by the federal government and
managed care plans operated by private companies.
The payment for a patient within any DRG is fixed for any particular hospital, but
varies between hospitals by region and hospital type (teaching or non-teaching). With the
exception of patients who stay in the hospital for a very long time, the hospital receives
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the same revenue from Medicare no matter how many services are provided to the patient
or how long the length of stay. The DRG list is a set of case types established under the
Prospective Payment System, which began in the fall of 1983, identifying patients with
similar conditions and processes of care. The DRG omitted in the regression is alcohol
abuse or dependence without complications (751).
A3.2.3 TEFRA
TEFRA established a cost-based system of limits on payments under which
psychiatric hospitals and psychiatric units in general hospitals are reimbursed. The
reimbursement limits represent total operating costs per discharge. The upper limit
(target rate per discharge) for inpatient operating costs per case is determined at the
beginning of the year. This amount is multiplied by the number of discharges to establish
the maximum annual reimbursement (target amount), which is set after the completion of
the fiscal year for each hospital. The upper limit (target rate per discharge) is increased
each year by an update factor.
TEFRA provides for incentive payments to hospitals that achieved operating costs
less than or equal to their target amounts. The incentive payment is the lesser of either
half the difference between the actual and target costs per discharge or five percent of the
target amount.
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 made changes in how Medicare reimburses PPS-
exempt facilities. These changes include linking updates to the financial performance of
facilities and capping target amounts.
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